JPRS 78920 8 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2392

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in <u>Government Reports</u>
<u>Announcements</u> issued semi-monthly by the <u>National Technical</u>
Information Service, and are listed in the <u>Monthly Catalog of</u>
<u>U.S. Government Publications</u> issued by the <u>Superintendent of</u>
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, <u>Washington</u>, D.C.
20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2392

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	
Arab States Purchase European Gliders (Shlomo Shamgar; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 6 Jul 81)	2
Arab Investors View Mitterrand Policies (Alan Tillier; 8 DAYS, 8 Aug 81)	3
PLO Gains Supporters in Latin America (8 DAYS, 8 Aug 81)	14
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Turkish Journalist Interviews Yasir 'Arafat (Yasir 'Arafat Interview; CUMHURIYET, 11 Aug 81)	5
'Arafat Views PLO Policies (Yasir 'Arafat Interview; 8 DAYS, 8 Aug 81)	7
Briefs Communist Parties Plot Against Iraq	9
AFGHANISTAN	
Traveler Describes Hizb-e Eslami Tactics, Successes (Peter Scholl-Latour; DER SPIEGEL, 17 Aug 81)	10
Gulbuddin's Band To Be Tried for Terrorism (KABUL NEW TIMES, 27 Jul 81)	25
Guerrillas Attempt To Unite (BBC World Service, 23 Aug 81)	27
Battle Near Gulbahar Reported (Balram Tandon; THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 27 Aug 81)	28

	New Afghan Daily Carries Karmal Message (Kabul Domestic Service, 19 Aug 81)	29
	Briefs	22
	Rebels Report Army Offensive	31 31
	Minority Language Books, Programming)1
IRAN		
	Mas'ud Rajavi on Alliance With Bani-Sadr (Mas'ud Rajavi Interview; BBC Television Network, 14 Aug 81)	32
	KPD Organ Defends Tudeh Stand, Criticizes Bani-Sadr (UNSERE ZEITUNG, 29 Jun 81)	31
	Tehran Radio Assails Compromising Arab Leaders (Tehran International Service, 16 Aug 81)	37
	Briefs Banonar Receives Turkish Amabassador	39
ISRAEL		
	West Bank Arabs Report on Settlement Activity (AL-DUSTUR, 15, 18 Jun 81)	40
	Features of Westwind Plane Described (Aharon Lapidot; BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR, Jun 81)	49
	Coal Seen as Major Alternative Energy Source (Avraham Dishon; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 6 Jul 81)	52
	Sinai Bedouins Complain of Return to Egyptian Rule (Ya'aqov Havaquq; HA'ARETZ, 3 Jul 81)	55
	Gush Emunim Plans Sinai Evacuation Protest (Jeffrey Heller; THE JERUSALEM POST, 5 Aug 81)	61
	Sabbath Ban Threatens Oil Exploration (Aryeh Wolman; THE JERUSALEM POST, 5 Aug 81)	62
	Tax Revenues Surpass Projections (Slomo Maoz; THE JERUSALEM POST, 4 Aug 81)	63
	Canal Threatens Losses for Dead Sea Works (Macabee Dean; THE JERUSALEM POST, 3 Aug 81)	64
	Construction Elements Hit Sinai Contract Methods (El'azar Levin; HA'ARETZ, 17 Aug 81)	65
	'HA'ARETZ' Assesses Sharon's W. Bank Policy (Ze'ev Schiff; HA'ARETZ, 14 Aug 81)	67

Brieis	
July Unemployment Statistics	69
Arab Protest Leaflet	69
Anti-Israeli Slogans, Songs	69
KUWAIT	
Importance of Nation's Animal Resources	
(AL-QABAS, 29 Jul 81)	70
Briefs	
Restricting Auditing Firms	71
Aid to Pakistan	71
TUNISIA	
Democracy, Labor Unions, Role of Communist Party Discussed	
(Mohamed Harmel Interview; AL-SHA'B, 24 Jul 81)	73

n

0.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARAB STATES PURCHASE EUROPEAN GLIDERS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 Jul 81 p 3

/Article by Shlomo Shamgar: "Arabs Purchase 150 Gliders in Germany"7

Text/ Syria has recently purchased 50 motorized gliders of the type which the terrorists have used to penetrate into Israel, and a shipment of 100 additional gliders will soon leave for Arab countries. This was reported in the German weekly DER SPIEGEL.

According to the weekly, these gliders are being produced in the town of Zieg in southern Germany by the technician Fritz Schweiger and the industrialist Eberhardt Jahle. The two have been involved in the production and export of gliders for 6 years.

The German weekly reports: "In 1979 six Syrians were trained for the first time in the glider school attached to the enterprise. Afterwards, the Syrians invited the two Germans to Syria, and there they trained additional Syrians in the Hermon area. One of the outstanding trainees at the time was the son of President Hafiz 'Asad.

"The Syrians wanted to add a small engine to the original model. Their request was fulfilled and after the modification was successfully tested in Germany, the Syrians ordered 50 such gliders."

Now the enterprise is preparing a shipment of 100 additional such gliders for other Arab countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq.

The cost of each such glider is 12,000 marks (almost 60,000 shekels). It is noteworthy that when the pilot of one of the terrorists' gliders was recently captured in Israel, it was found that he was trained in Syria for this attack.

According to the German weekly, the two Germans who are producing the motorized glider are aware that it has military use, and they are cooperating secretly with the West German military authorities. The two of them, incidentally, served in the West German Army.

However, in spite of this, the two maintained to the DER SPIEGEL reporter that they were "very surprised" when they found out that their product is likely to be used for an attack on Israel. According to them, there were no Palestinians among the Arab "sportsmen" who had trained with them. They also contend that they cannot track every glider which they sell and they do not consider themselves guilty of exporting weapons to the terrorists "just as the Daimler Benz enterprises are not guilty if someone uses a Mercedes to rob a bank."

5830 CSO: 4323/25

ARAB INVESTORS VIEW MITTERAND POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 31, 8 Aug 81 pp 34-35

[Article by Alan Tillier]

[Text]

DESPITE REASSURANCES from French officials and bankers, Arab investors are worried about President Mitterrand's nationalisation policies, and some private financiers have already pulled out.

Arab mistrust, according to investors in Paris, centres mainly on the Communist presence in Mitterrand's cabinet and French attitudes towards Israel. There are Arab sources who still maintain that the president gave King Khaled assurances on the first point, amounting to the statement: 'I am as anti-communist as you are.'

French envoys continue to circulate in the Gulf with soothing words about the continuation of arms sales, and the safety of Arab government and private deposits in France. Leading Saudi investors have been reassured about their stake in the arms manufacturer. Thomson CSF.

The most recent envoy was Claude de Kemoularia, adviser on international affairs at the Banque de Paris et du Pays Bas (Paribas), the major French merchant bank which holds stakes or represents those of private clients (including Arab investors) in hundreds of French companies.

Kemoularia is not a banker by training but he straddles the financial and political worlds with great case. On a visit to Abu Dhabi, he announced: 'There will be no change in France's economic policy towards foreign and Arab investment. As a banker with responsibilities, I can state that the free movement of goods and investments will be maintained in France without conditions or shackles.' Unfortunately, Kemoularia's own bank is up for nationalisation.

'Arabs are postponing investment decisions,' said Roger Azar, one of Paris's leading advisers to Saudi investors. 'On the other hand, it is hardly the moment to sell assets here', he added.

assets here , i

The Bourse is down 20 per cent, and sizeable Arab stakes in some companies—such as Creusot-Loire (steel), banking groups like Suez and Credit Commercial de France (Abu Dhabi interests) and the arms manufacturer Matra—could well be affected as they are all due for nationalisation.

The French guarantee of free flow of capital calmed the fears of many Arab investors. Shortly after Mitterrand's victory, some private Gulf investors left, but the governments have stayed. Commenting on the anxieties of private investors, one Paris-based Arab banker said: 'It is not necessarily a political problem. These are people who seek maximum security, and they just don't know this government.'

Before the elections, some Arab investors who were misled by the polls into expecting a Giscard victory bought prestigious buildings on the Champs Elysees, like Fouquet's restaurant. There has been no Arab investment since the results were announced.

As far as foreign governments are concerned, the French are hoping for Saudi participation in a \$5bn public loan scheduled for launching after the summer holidays. In the opinion of one Arab banker, France would have to pay ½ per cent over Libor to attract Arab funds.

On a more optimistic note, Paris has recently patched up relations with Tripoli and resumed arms sales to Libya — which has between \$1bn and \$2bn in Paris banks like the Algerian-Libyan Banque Intercontinentale Arabe.

But Arab suspicions remain, given the pro-Israeli lobby inside the French Socialist Party. The recent decision by Paris to withdraw support for the Arab boycott has all adv brought a warning from Kuwait about the future of Arab investment in France.

CSO: 4300/93

PLO CAINS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 81, 8 Aug 81 pp 16-17

[Text]

THE PLO has succeeded in winning diplomatic recognition in four Latin American countries — Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua —and it continues through official and unofficial missions to press its case in the continent. A measure of its success is the fact that since 1974 all but three Latin American countries have, at some point, expressed support for the Palestinians at the United Nations.

Latin America will host the forthcoming UN seminar on Palestinian rights, to be held on 31 August-4 September at Havana's Palacio de Convenciones. This regional seminar, one of four, was mandated by the General Assembly in 1979 and included 21 Latin American states among its proponents.

The UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People had hoped to find a suitable venue for the seminar in a non-member country (Cuba is vice-chairman of the committee). Panama was to be the venue initially but the government declared that the dates put forward by the committee were unsuitable. Guyana (a committee member) declined to host the seminar for similar reasons.

In 1974, six Latin American states were among those which voted in the UN General Assembly for recognition for the PLO and the affirmation of Palestinian rights. At the end of last year's emergency debate on Palestine the number had reached 22. Though most Latin American states could not be accused of consistency in their UN voting only three — Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay — have never expressed recognition of Palestinian rights.

Recently PLO diplomatic activity at the UN has been accompanied by a drive to strengthen links with political parties and opposition groups in Latin America. PLO headquarters in Beirut has hosted a stream of Latin American visitors and numerous

Palestinian delegations have toured the continent. While some elements of the PLO, most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, continue to cultivate contacts with Latin American guerrilla groups, such as Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the scattered remnants of Argentina's Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), mainstream PLO efforts have been concentrated on finding friends in ruling and opposition parties, popular organisations and the church hierarchy.

Palestinian publications have highlighted the visits to Beirut of such Latin American personalities as former Bolivian president Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a presidential candidate in last year's elections, who was a guest of the PLO after a delegation of Bolivia's Popular and Democratic Union (UDP) coalition visited PLO headquarters. Other visitors have included Brazilian parliamentarians Joao Hercolino and Airton Soares; a multi-party parliamentary delegation from Peru; Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) deputy secretary general Lucia Romero Santiago; the leader (since assassinated) of El Salvador's Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), Manuel Franco, and the leader of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front (FMLN), Shafiq Jorge Handal.

One of the regular Palestinian visitors to Latin America is Ibrahim Ayyad, a Catholic priest and member of the Palestine National Council. Ayyad's contacts with Latin American ecclesiastical have proved valuable. In 1978 he was received by Chilean Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez who affirmed his support 'for the rights and just cause of the Palestinian people'.

Palestinian contacts with opposition circles in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala have probably been facilitated by Israel's aggressive military sales in the

CSO: 4300/93

TURKISH JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS YASIR 'ARAFAT

NC141051 Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Aug 81 p 3

[Interview granted by PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat to CUMHURIYET correspondent Cengiz Candar in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] The Turkish Government has adopted an energetic stand following the latest Israeli attacks. It has issued a stern communique denouncing Israel. What is more, for the first time it has extended medical aid. Has the attitude adopted by Turkey this time satisfied you?

[Answer] (Butting in before the question ended) We had expected more than that, particularly after the barbaric attack on the Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. We must not forget that Turkey is a member of the Islamic conference which has adopted various resolutions. That is why I believe that the Turkish Government should have taken a step further. It should take a concrete step and sever all its relations with the Israeli military junta, which has murdered women and children.

The Israelis do not confine their attacks to military targets. They have proved this during the Palestine-Israeli fighting which lasted for 15 days during the month of Ramadan. However, all their attempts have met with failure. We have shown that we can resist. We have proved that not only can we resist, but that we can also act resolutely and take some advanced steps and thus achieve victory over this Israeli military junta.

[Question] If we take into consideration that Turkey, in its capacity as a member of NATO, is in close touch with the Americans, don't you think that it can play a role in persuading the United States to recognize the PLO?

[Answer] I doubt it; I do not think so. The Americans insist on maintaining their present attitude. Even the Europeans have been unable to change the U.S. attitude. However, supporting the Palestinian cause is a moral and historic responsibility of Turkey, because the Palestinian people who are under occupation are subjected to constant attacks by Israel, which enjoys unlimited American support. Against this, the Turkish Government should use every possible influence in supporting its Palestinian brothers in any other way.

[Question] After the latest war, there is a general conviction that the United States may change its attitude toward the PLO. The U.S. officials in general,

and Alexander Haig in particular, have stated that the Camp David Accord should be subjected to radical changes.

[Answer] I do not build castles in the air. This is a plot against the Palestinians, against our future, and against our women and children. I am sorry to say that I am not optimistic. They do not seem to be altering their attitude in any way. They insist on the Camp David Accord.

[Question] Do you think that the cease-fire can be lasting and steady?

[Answer] Begin was very specific. He has arrogantly stated that this cease-fire would be temporary. And now they are preparing for a new military expedition, a very extensive operation. Begin's words during those days when he had formed his government was an open warning to us. He said: Watch your step. But we are prepared for him. We are determined and we know what we are doing. We will achieve victory sooner or later. No one should doubt this. We are marching in the direction which history flows. They are opposing it.

[Question] Under the circumstances, in what direction is the Palestinian diplomacy heading in the period ahead?

[Answer] We have many plans but we prefer not to talk about them. Let militant acts speak for itself, not words. (After a short pause he went on.) Nevertheless, let me give you some clues. We are determined to increase our activities in all fields, for we have to turn the victory we have achieved in the 15-day war with Israel into a political victory. We are going to observe an international solidarity day next month with the peoples of Palestine and Lebanon. An Arab summit may convene this year. We have asked the nonaligned countries to form a support committee which will remain in action permanently. On the other hand, we have many other arenas of struggle.

[Question] Now I wish to ask you a non-political question. This is a journalist's question. Had you ever thought that al-Fakhani, (the part of Beirut which is inhabited by Palestinian civilians, one of the PLO centers) would have been attacked by the Israeli air force?

[Answer] Yes, 48 hours earlier. Here is the AS-SIYASAH, a Kuwaiti newspaper which carries an interview with me. This is what I had said: "The next 48 hours will be hell let loose. Wait and see." Yes, I was expecting it; in fact, I was expecting more. But I assure you, the Israelis must expect far more from us. It is true they possess considerable military strength. But this strength is not theirs. It is American strength; it is American technology, American weapons, and American planes. It is the American bombs that rain over our people every day. We cannot, by any means, compare our military strength with theirs. But there is only one thing they will never achieve: That is our resoluteness, our faith, our strong will and our lofty spirit. We are marching in the direction which history flows.

CSO: 4654/137

'ARAFAT VIEWS PLO POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 31, 8 Aug 81 pp 14-15

[Interview with Yasser 'Arafat by Patrice Barrab]

[Text]

Question: Are you not tired of having to answer the same questions without any change in the situation through the years?

Answer: Well, it is all part of our struggle. We know that our adversary uses every available means to combat us, including the information networks and the media. For this reason, given my position as commander in chief of the Palestinian revolution and president of the PLO, it is my duty to keep world opinion informed about our side of the story.

Has your analysis changed?

We are each day confronted by new developments, but our adversary has not changed positions and has even increased aggression.

What has been the most important development in recent years on the path to peace?

First of all, there has been no step towards peace. On the contrary, aggression and the escalation of hostilities against the Palestinian people have intensified, along with those against the Arab nation, as the Israeli air attack on the Osirak reactor in Tammuz has shown. The Israelis do not care about international guarantees.

Second, there is this hell in which the Palestinian and Lebanese people live in the South Lebanon, with the Israeli military junta using the area to test its latest weaponry. Most of the casualties are civilians and women and children. And the US administration continues to abet Israel with funds and arms. No, in the past few years tension and a state of war have predominated.

And we continue our struggle, which is to be able to live in peace one day, Muslims, Christians and Jews, in liberty, equality and in fraternity, in peace, on the land of peace. In 1974, when you addressed the UN, you said that you held in the one hand an olive branch and in the other the gun of a freedom fighter. What is the situation now?

My dual position has not changed. I believe in a just peace. Not in a peace of the weak, of slaves. I will continue to fight those who wish to force the olive branch away from me, including the Israeli military junta of racist and nazi outlaws. Indeed, the prime minister and the foreign minister of Israel are wanted by British justice. There is even an Interpol warrant out against them. Do you consider Europe to be sufficiently strong to initiate an independent peace effort?

I regret to have to say no! It is sad to see to what American influence is a determinant in the formulation of European foreign policy. In accordance, one must ask several questions regarding the viability of European technology and economic assistance. After the Israeli raid on Tammuz, it is essential to know whether the Europeans are willing to shoulder their responsibilities and honour their commitments. To what point is European assistance vulnerable to international banditry? We must be given an answer. Do you think Giscard d'Estaing might

eventually have recognised the PLO? And what do you expect of Mitterrand?

I cannot indulge in political fiction. Mr Giscard d'Estaing is no longer in power in France. It is true that much was achieved in his presidency regarding the rights of the Palestinian people. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO representative in Paris, was recently received by different officials of the new administration in France, and has undertaken important discussions. However, it seems that the French position has not yet crystallised.

Whatever the case, Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, has said that France did not intend recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian

people.

It is important that he remember the facts: over 115 countries have recognised the PLO as the unique voice and representation of the Palestinian people almost twice the number which has recognised Israel. The Arab League has recognised us. We are a fully-fledged member of the Islamic Conference, of the non-aligned movement and we have been given observer status in the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and in the United Nations. The PLO is a democracy in its own right. Its members are freely elected. There are no rival factions. And I am its elected representative. Recently the French people were aggravated by American reaction to the appointment of communists to the French cabinet. Likewise, we will not tolerate foreign intervention in our internal affairs. Are the French people of courage and resistance, or are they lackeys of a Vichy-style representation? All our people accept us, whether in exile or in occupied territory. Would you prefer Begin or Shimon Peres to

head an Israeli government?

It makes no difference to us. Both are alike in deed although may differ in appearance.

What could you do to help the forces of peace in Israel itself?

Actually it's the other way round. The progressives in Israel must themselves realise the tragedy and the unique situation of our people, where 60 per cent live in a

diaspora while 40 per cent live under occupation of their land. Our own political programme stipulates a peaceful situation of coexistence on equal terms, well beyond current antagonisms. We do not hate the Jews. We believe that Judaism is part of our civilisation, of our cultural heritage.

We are with the tide of history, while the clique in power in Israel is not. They will sooner or later realise their error and we will be victorious. One cannot go against the course of history.

Does this mean that you are willing to talk to

Israeli progressives?

We have already had discussions with Israeli progressives! We have met them in Paris, in Rome, in Prague, in Sofia. I myself met a progressive member of the Israeli parliament, Charly Bitton, during the international peace conference in Sofia in September 1930. And I did so publicly. Imagine that Menachem Begin turned up to see you in such a meeting, unannounced?

I do not like to ask for the moon. Besides, Menachem Begin is not the moon. He is a

terrorist at large.

Don't you sometimes want to leave all this, at least your position as leader of the Palestinian people? Don't you lose hope?

To go where? To do what? I am a refugee — without a home, without a nationality. I have no passport. We do not have the choice. The fascist and racist policies of the Israeli government have isolated us. We would like to live in freedom, in digrity, as equals of the other peoples in this world. My only choice is to continue my struggle. Regarding my tenure as president of the Executive Committee of the PLO, only the Palestinian National Council can decide. And who am I to abandon my responsibilities? I owe allegiance to my people.

Finally, whoever told you that I had lost hope? Each time that I see a Palestinian child I am fired by its determination and hope and will continue to free my people from the torment inflicted by history and upheld continually by the Israeli

government.

CSO: 4300/93

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST PARTIES PLOT AGAINST IRAQ--The Foreign Ministry has received detailed accounts of acts of terrorism carried out by some groups in a number of Middle East countries--groups that are prompted by international communism. One of the reports says that 15 days ago Arab communist parties held a meeting in Prague in which they adopted a decision to wage a propaganda war and carry out instigations against the Iraqi regime, which was described in the unpublished decisions of these parties as practicing terrorism and suppression against communists in Iraq. The report adds that the Syrian and Iraqi communist parties played a prominent role in making these parties adopt this decision. [Text] [NC201252 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 20 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/118

TRAVELER DESCRIBES HIZB-E ESLAMI TACTICS, SUCCESSES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Aug 81 pp 110-123

[Report by Peter Scholl-Latour about his time with the partisans in the "forgotten war in Afghanistan:" "'Grab Your Machinegun!'"]

[Text] The operation began as a masquerade. In the bazaar in Peshawar we had had some Afghan clothes made for us and were trying on the unshapely wide trousers with amazement. A flappy shirt down to the knees and a vest were part of our outfit.

When we looked at ourselves in the mirror on the eve of our departure, wearing a huge Pushtun turban or the round cap of the Nuristani, we thought we looked quite grotesque, particularly with our stubble a la Yasir Arafat.

But the mujahedin of the Afghan resistance organization Hizb-e Eslami with whom we wanted to cross the border into Afghanistan had insisted absolutely on our masquerading that way. Else we would not have a chance to pass through the Pakistani checks, and in Afghanistan itself we would expose ourselves to extreme danger wearing European clothes.

We had been asked to report to the Hizb-e Eslami headquarters in the town's Fairabad district at 0600 hours.

There 3 brightly painted Afghan buses were waiting already, with about 180 mujahedin crammed inside. In that crowd we would submerge without drawing attention, if need be pretending to be Turkmens or Uzbeks in case Pakistani police should ask.

The atmosphere on the buses was one of joyful excitement. Most of the young men, as yet unarmed and returning to the fighting area after a period of recuperation in the rear as part of a carefully scheduled system of rotation, could not wait to return to the "holy war."

At the entrance of the Hizb-e Eslam headquarters, laid out like a fortress around an improvised mosque, there stood heavily armed guards with rapid-fire Kalashnikovs who bodily checked every visitor for arms or explosives.

The day before, inside the interlocking premises, we had interviewed the leader of this fundamentalist Islamic party. Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, a lean man of about 30 years, made no secret of his convictions.

His movement was in the forefront of the fight against the Soviet invasion, but unlike other Afghan resistance groups, he rejected any cooperation with the West and particularly with the United States. "We do not need any help from abroad," Hekmatiar assured us; "if need be we will procure our arms on the battlefield its 1f."

The leader of the Hizb-e Eslami had resisted the state power for as long as 7 years. In 1974, on behalf of militant Islam, his friends--young military men and students-had staged a coup against President Dawud and had almost been executed.

His gaze somewhat veiled and turned inward, as is often true of devout and very deeply committed Muslims, Hekmatiar spoke to us in a low, controlled voice. In regard to the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, he made a bold, downright arrogant statement, saying that it was the aim of the Hizb-e Eslami to liberate not only Afghanistan but all coreligionists exposed to the yoke of alien domination and godlessness on the other side of the Amu Darya.

In Peshawar we had been asked frequently why of all people we had chosen the Hizb-e Eslami to accompany us on our trip.

I had quite consciously turned to that extreme Islamic group. Apart from its fight against the Russian invaders, it wants to subject its own feudal lords to the egalitarianism of early Islam but, on the other hand, distrusts the obscure or at least naive religious concepts of the rural mullahs. It had been my experience that in the partisans' war the future belonged to the radical, the intransigeant organizations.

Basically the founders of the Hizb-e Eslami and also its present leaders came from the Afghan intelligentsia and a wing of the petite bourgeoisie seeking a religious and, above all, also social renewal by returning to the fundamental principles of early Islam.

It appears to turn out that these Muslim revolutionaries, who in some ways are related to the Muslim Brotherhood, have conspiratorial and organizational abilities lacking in the other fighting groups.

There is no doubt that the pro-Soviet propaganda of the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul has made the Hizb-e Eslam its primary target. Invariably it portrays Hekmatiar with blood streaming down his face. Apparently the ruling Marxists also want to include the Afghan oligarchies and the mullahs in a broad defensive front against this trend of radical Islamic renewal.

When the buses finally got moving after quite a long wait, the subaltern officers jumped up from their seats shouting, "Nara-i-takbir"--meaning something like "invocation and glorification."

The mujahedin replied in unison, "Allahu akbar" (God is great), and this shout was repeated three times, with their index fingers pointed heavenward.

It turned out to be an endless journey. When we reached the tribal area of the Pushtuns, Pakistani soldiers and police, still guarding the forts from the Kipling era, frequently stopped out transport.

But the rousing shout of "Allahu akbar" and the assurances of our fellow travelers that they were Afghan mujahedin returning to the front protected us from a more detailed identity check which might have put a sudden end to our journey.

The road was winding through rocky terrain toward Parakhinar. While the rice and wheat fields became more scarce, there was an increase in makeshift housing of Afghan refugees and black goatskin tents of namads in checkered clothing.

The laborious journey took 10 hours. We had climbed above an altitude of 2,000 meters, the air becoming thinner and cooler. Over a crushed-stone road, as the sun was setting, we finally reached the border village of Teremangal, at the end of a tip of Pakistani country digging deep into Afghan territory.

Teremangal looks like a big transit point for caravans from Marco Polo's times. Long rows of two-hump camels arrive with their loads. The Pushtun women, dressed in bright red, stay in the background, away from the strange men. The steep height, where one could already see the Afghan border, is guarded by a Pakistani fort. A mysterious busy atmosphere rules in Teremangal—the atmosphere of big adventure.

We were quickly accommodated in a teahouse in order that the spies of all conceivable organizations might not notice prematurely that a German television crew was trying to make its way here to Afghanistan. The leader of our operation, a bearded Pushtun with a lambskin cap, called "Shahid" (one who professes), told us that we would leave in the middle of the night, that 30 armed mujahedin would stay with us for our immediate protection and that a further group of 150 men at some distance would insure additional security.

We had already bought four donkeys and six horses in Peshawar to transport our cumbersome TV equipment. The night in Teremangal was taken up primarily by packing and briefings, with green and black tea keeping us awake and making us nervous. We hardly got any sleep.

The departure in the dark and mud (it had rained the day before) took place in great disarray. As we hurried to the border across a steep slope that seemed to go on forever, the early sun was spreading its first light, and we were lucky not to be detained at the last minute by Pakistani border soldiers.

The Afghan border post on the other side had been devastated and burned. Next to it we discovered a destroyed Soviet armored personnel carrier. Shahid, riding aside me, explained that this area had been liberated from Russians and communists as long as 2 years before.

We descended into the valley along tall green pinewoods. We were in an area where before the outbreak of hostilities German development aid personnel had promoted a big forest project. But all foreigners had long since vanished from this territory, and of the lumber mill only the outer walls were still standing.

Commander Shahid, who knew only Pushtu and Dari (the Persian spoken primarily in central and northern Afghanistan), told me through our two interpreters, Afghan engineering student Wali from Hildesheim and social science student Amin from Strasbourg, that we now should proceed in small groups of two or three men.

At a distance of about 6 kilometers, he pointed out to us a fortified military camp which was still in the hands of pro-Soviet government forces and from where the mujahedin passing through were fired on from time to time.

"On the whole," Shahid explained, "they behave peaceably, expecting us too to leave them in peace; anyway, they are only being supplied by helicopters and are largely isolated."

We went through a number of villages which were partly still inhabited even though occasionally rocket attacks had torn holes in the loam walls. The wheat was tall. The apricot trees were bearing their first fruit.

The men accompanying us were not particularly well armed. They carried British Enfield rifles from World War II and occasionally betrayed some nervousness because it was said that the Jerji tribe of the Pushtuns was not a reliable partner in the fight against the Russians and occasionally could even be bought. Possibly here for the first time the rivalry between Afghan resistance groups was manifesting itself, for by no means all mujahedin sympathize with the zealots of the Hibz-e Eslami.

In the course of that day we realized what strain we were facing. One steep slope followed another. We stumbled through rocky riverbeds and with great effort worked our way upward on the mountain trails. When we had reached the first big pass at an altitude of 4,300 meters, where the snow-white sugarloaf mountain of the Safed Koh seemed close enough to touch, our confidence waned, and we wondered if we would weather our operation.

All mujahedin who-coming from Pakistan—were moving into the interior of Afghanistan were equipped with infantry arms, but those who-coming from the interior-were moving in the direction of Teremangal were unarmed.

It was plausible that there were sizable arsenals and arms caches near the border.

We were particularly impressed with a troop of slit-eyed Mongols who hurried up a steep slope on the run. They belonged to the people of the Hazarah settled in the inaccessible nuclear area of Afghanistan around Barmiyan and its glorious remnants of Buddhist culture.

Adherents of the Shiite branch of Islam, the Hazarah are among the bravest fighters of the holy war and in their rocky redoubts are hardly bothered by the pro-Soviet armed forces. These descendants of Genghis Khan spirited past us like an apparition, greeted us with "salaam aleikum" and vanished behind the nearest height.

Toward evening we reached a rocky mountain valley and another "samovar." The place was called Laredar. Armed groups were already camped around the tea hunt.

The time had come to conduct a talk on basic points with Commander Shahid, it having been the original plan of the Hizb-e Eslami to escort our camera crew far into the interior of the country, into the Province of Parwan north of Kabui.

The distance we would have had to cover on the way there and back was 600 kilometers as the crow flies but in reality probably double that. On this very first day we had come to realize that the mujahedin's ideas of time and distance far overtaxed our abilities.

Among Afghans it apparently was part of manly competition—a bit of boasting included—to cope with an extended difficult high—mountain area in a minimum of time. Only this almost incredible mobility and stamina explain the fact that resistance against the Soviet expansion of power is holding its own throughout the country.

The Russian infantrymen, of course, are no more able than a German camera crew to advance at a comparable speed or to find their way in this wilderness.

It was to turn out later that the Hizb-e Eslami combined a quite definite plan with our expedition: strong mujahedin forces that had been concentrated near the former excursion spot of Paghman about 20 kilometers from Kabul were to do open battle there with the Soviets and their Afghan allies.

It was a difficult talk with Shahid when I had to explain to him that we could not go along with the speed of the march and the destination prescribed to us by the mujahedin. Our tour would have extended to at least 2 months, and after 2 weeks we would probably have reached such a state of exhaustion as to make any further camera work impossible.

Before the commander then finally continued by forced march with his partisans on his way to the locality of Asrow 10 hours away (which had been bombarded by the Russians on the previous days) we took leave of one another with the threefold fraternal kiss customary among the Afghan mountain peoples.

Two armed mujahedin were left behind for our protection--no idle precaution considering that the equipment and also the cash which we were transporting represented unimaginable riches in this wilderness.

This stay in Laredar turned out to be something extraordinary. Apparently we were on one of the big routes of infiltration of the resistance fighters leading into the surroundings of Kabul and into the extreme north of Afghanistan.

Without letup there arrived new squads of mujahedin of the most varied racial and political character, resting briefly next to our samovar for some tea and a little cooked rice.

Then they devoutly performed their prayers, with their guns within reach. The respective commander also acted as prayer leader or "imam." The fatiha, the opening sura of the Koran, resounded solemnly through the rocky mountain valley.

Two old men with white beards addressed us in a joyous and happy manner. Pointing heavenward and outlining helicopters, they cursed the "shurawi" (Soviets) and imitated the bark of a machinegun. Even for those old men, who moved around in the precipitous terrain with amazing agility, the holy war apparently was great fun.

Whenever an armed group turned up we asked about its political affiliation. If they were Hizb-e Eslami men they would embrace our two bodyguards, and we would join them around the fire. But when partisans of the Harakat Inkelab-e Eslami showed up and stuck a poster bearing the picture of their leader Mohammadi on the stone wall of our tearoon, the atmosphere became tense, almost hostile.

The very first day we had been struck by the fact that the Afghans never moved around without a gun. To have a firearm was an indispensable confirmation of their virility for them. I had to think of Montherlant's statement that the gun is "a second male member."

Until late into the night I discussed with our interpreter Amin, the social science student, the political orientation of his party and the troublesome fraternal strife between the various partisan groups.

For these simple and devout men, Islam is an obsessive religion which pervades every sphere of their daily life. The Hizb-e Eslami rejects outright the National Islamic Front of the feudal lord and descendant of the Prophet, Gailani, well known and frequently supported in the West.

According to Amin, this movement is too pro-American and not apt to do justice to the social revolutionary aims the Islamic fundamentalists have set themselves. It is with profound anger that he mentions the tiny but probably quite effective Maoist action group which manages to engage in acts of sabotage under the name of "Sama."

The trouble was that the West tended to support Westernized grand bourgeois and tribal emirs who used to move around the environs of the Kabul court. On the other hand, there was a tendency among leftist intellectuals in France and Germany to overvalue Marxist splinter groups and to follow their struggle with committed support.

Before our departure I had listened carefully to what foreign, including U.S., observers had to say and found out about the opinions of Pakistani special services.

All were agreed that the tightly organized movement of "engineer" Gulbuddin Hekmatiar had the best chance to prevail in the end. Occasionally its conspiratorial experience and its uncompromising discipline were compared to Tito's communist partisan movement in Yugoslavia during World War II, whereas Gailani and other pro-Western figures are seen as Afghan parallels to the unfortunate Serbian Colonel Mihalovic.

In Laredar we spent the night on the bare floor of the smoke-filled "samovar."

During the first night the camera crew became the victims of innumerable fleabites, and fleas were also to be our constant companions in the days to follow.

As a first meal we were offered some rice and a few potatoes and some sugared green tea. We did not get any rest, what with the "host" of our establishment constantly stumbling over the sleeping people to fetch sparse supplies for new groups of mujahedin from his cases and boxes.

After sitting around the camp fire for a few hours to warm themselves, these warriors resumed their march into the mountains undaunted. There also arrived a caravan with wounded men, and then was shown on its way to Pakistan. The Russians had bombarded the Tessin Pass leading to the Kabul-Jalalabad road, with 17 people killed and a large number wounded.

Early in the morning already, there approached some camel from the direction of the Pakistani border loaded with bazooka projectiles. There was now no end to the stream of mujahedin. Our cameraman Baldur Freek spoke of a "Mujahedin Highway."

A comparison with Vietnam was quite inappropriate, because U.S. air reconnaissance would long since have smashed such concentrations of partisans, and we would have had to expect B-52 area bombing.

To our great surprise the arsenal of the mujahedin was also far better than expected. Hunting rifles and antiquated shotguns have long since disappeared.

In addition to the Enfield rifle, the Russian Kalashnikov--also called AK 47--increasingly is the basic equipment. Added to this are light submachineguns of Soviet and British manufacture and a fairly big caliber antiaircraft gun the Russians called "dashka."

Time and again we noted that there was no lack of armor-piercing weapons and that barrels of the RPG-7, plus projectiles, were among the most frequent freight.

We took a careful look at the marks of origin of these bazookas. Apparently it is part of a tacitly agreed policy to supply the Afghan partisans with equipment of Soviet manufacture or at least Soviet type.

A bearded Pushtun warrior, a giant of a man, explained to us quite credibly, with his followers agreeing, that the mujahedin had long since overcome their initial fear of tanks, that they would often dance for joy when Russian tanks were reported to be approaching, with the fighters of the holy war then vying for the honor of firing the bazookas from the greatest distance.

Having lost much of their effect, the Soviet fighter planes, mostly MIG-21's, are considered primarily a means of psychological warfare.

On the other hand, the Soviet MI-24 helicopters remain lethal and almost invulnerable; owning to their titanium armor they cannot be shot down even by 12.7-mm heavy machineguns, such as reportedly have been delivered lately in a roundabout way by the Chinese.

What the Afghan resistance lacks without a doubt is surface-to-air missiles. The mountain warriors are helpless in the face of the missiles and armament of the MI-24's. The troop movements of the Russians on the roads controlled by them during the day take place under the indispensable protection of the invulnerable helicopters.

So it does not take much imagination to figure out how fundamentally the overall strategic situation would change if the Afghans one day were actually equipped even to a modest extent with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. It would lead to a decisive turn in the war.

The Russians would be pushed into the defensive and presumably would not even be able to hold the most indispensable transit routes leading from the Amu Darya via the Salang Pass to Kabul and from there via the big circular road to Kandahar and Herat.

In the succeeding days, as we continued our march, I realized that a comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam was fairly misleading. While later, on our way toward Asrow, we encountered mountain villages which from time to time had been attacked from the air, there is no systematic action of annihilation by the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan such as was practiced in the "free fire zones" by the U.S. Air Force in Indochina.

Nor had the wheat fields, about to be harvested, been destroyed by chemicals. A continuous air force presence such as the Americans could afford even in the most remote corners of Indochina does not exist here. Apparently the Russian helicopters and MIG's are needed in their entirety for protecting the most important towns and keeping the big strategic roads under surveillance.

The numerical ratio is also likely to develop increasingly to the disadvantage of the Red Army. According to experts, a 10:1 ratio is needed to fight partisans with a chance of success. In Afghanistan the ratio is nowhere near that.

Even if the Russians had 100,000 men stationed in Afghanistan rather than the 85,000 constantly mentioned officially—with at most 20,000 being actual combat forces—it would be a wholly inadequate number.

The Afghan government army fighting on the Russian side has shrunk like goat leather in the past few months, and its combat readiness leaves a lot to be desired. Massive desertions occur time and again, and the present number is estimated at 35,000 at most.

Confronting these forces, according to conservative estimates, are about 100,000 well-armed, highly motivated mujahedin, experienced in mountain warfare, and in addition there are at least 100,000 partisans who are peasants and traders during the day but are available to the various resistance movements as armed auxiliary forces at any time.

Toward noon Amin told me that an about 300 men strong Hizb-e Eslami unit had arrived. These men, who had split up into groups of 20 to 30 men to camouflage themselves against air attacks, were well armed and were under a tight command.

Amin introduced himself to the commander, a bearded Tajik with a black turban, about 30 years old, by the name of Abdul-Wadud, who enjoyed special prestige.

His elder brother Mohammad Omar had been a leader in 1974, when he was a medical student, in the Islamic coup against President Dawud and had been executed when the putsch failed. Regarded as a martyr ("shahid"), he was always referred to as "Dr Shahid" in the conversation.

After a brief talk Abdul-Wadud said he was prepared to escort us a further stretch into the interior of the country in the direction of the Kabul-Jalalabad road, which I had chosen as our destination. Unlike our first escort, he displayed complete understanding for the demands of our television work and our slow rate of advance.

His men constituted a fierce, bold and likable crowd. They included not only Pushtuns but Tajiks and Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan. Though Persian by language and strain, the Tajiks predominantly are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam.

The majority of their fellow tribesmen live on the other side of the border, in Soviet Tajikestan. The Uzbeks, on the other hand, considered Turkic, are related to the Mongols.

I could not help but again and again compare the Afghan mujahedin with their likeminded Palestinian or Iranian comrades. Among these Afghans one could notice great relaxation and self-assurance coupled with devout readiness to sacrifice one's self. There was not a trace here of the hysteria of so many of the Palestinian fedayeen or the hectic neurotic behavior of so many of the Iranian Pasdaran.

Abdul-Wadud comes from the Province of Takhar in the extreme northeast of Afghanistan. The village he comes from lies on the Amu Darya only 50 kilometers from the Soviet border. In 1979 he had fooled the government of President Hafizullah Amin, who was assassinated later, into believing that along with 300 followers he intended to join the fight of the Marxist government against the rebels.

He received 300 guns, went into resistance with them and led the first attack against the provincial capital Faizabad in Badakhshan.

Though originally a teacher, Abdul-Wadud had now turned into a model leader in the holy war. He gathers his people under a picture of Hekmatiar, and the student Kais from Kabul with a megaphone leads their chanting, with a mujahedin hailing their party, the Hizb-e Eslami, their leader Hekmatiar and the independence of Afghanistan. But the shout that recurs constantly is "Allahu akbar."

Abuse of the Soviet Union, communism and the red "quislings" of Kabul is followed by the shout of "margbar America"--"death to the Americans."

The confrontation with Moscow has not by any means led to a conciliatory attitude toward the West, even though we learned in later conversations that the Iranian revolution of Khomeyni was not quite to the liking of most Afghan resistance fighters. An important difference, according to Amin's translations, was the fact that the strict structures of the Shiite clerics had a disconcerting effect on Afghanistan's Sunnite majority.

From now on we continued on our way--partly on foot and partly on horseback, together with Abdul-Wadud's force. We crossed wild mountain terrain, which we found very difficult. The horses moved with extreme agility along the steep slopes and in the rocky riverbed which we reached toward evening. When we arrived at the next but one "tshaykhana," which was far more spacious though not any more hygienic than our last "samovar" in Laredar, the main body of Abdul-Wadud Uzbek-Tajik force had already reached the riverbed.

With their camp fires, their horses and donkeys, their fur caps and arms, they presented an extremely warlike picture. Amin explained to me that the atmosphere of the army camp already was typical of northern Afghanistan and its nomads. As for us, we felt a little like being guests at Genghis Khan's.

Abdul-Wadud told us that he too was taking part in the great race toward the Province of Parwan, to where the Pushtun leader Shahid was supposed to have escorted us. But his real final destination was his home Province of Takhar and the immediate proximity of Soviet Tajikestan.

The simple mujahedin who had crowded around us, demonstrating their friendship in every way, assured us at the camp fire that it was their intention not only to liberate Afghanistan from the godless "shurawi"—the Soviets—but to bring their Muslim brothers in Soviet Tajikestan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan their independence from the Russians and restoration of the true faith. They share the bold dreams of their chairman Hekmatiar.

Meanwhile our television crew of five men integrated smoothly into Abdul-Wadud's warlike force. In the camp at Aserre (the name of the small resting place) the conversation of the mujahedin constantly centered round the military situation. For these simple men from the mountains, who normally earn a hard living as tenant farmers or day laborers, the holy war constitutes a great adventure, a manly fulfillment.

We learned that the most important towns of Afghanistan, such as Kandahar and Herat, were only sporadically under the complete control of the Soviet Army. Though the war conditions on the whole seemed chaotic to a western observer, there apparently existed a comparatively well functioning system of rotation between the resistance fighters and all the various provinces.

The Hizb-e Eslami, which doubtless has the most solid organization, has established a so-called shura, an elected assembly, as a local body in each province.

Of course the Afghans try to play down the rivalries existing between the various organizations. Nevertheless there is great distrust, even enmity, among the various groupings. There are even said to be armed conflicts and raids against armed caravans.

There are numerous tribal organizations in the interior of the country which are hardly known in Pakistani Peshawar of Quetta and are conducting their "jihad" entirely autonomously. But this variety can also prove to be an advantage for the partisans. The Soviet military machine does not have the slightest chance to smash the front of its adversaries once and for all in a well-aim of operation. The Afghan resistance is a kind of Hydra which is constantly growing new heads.

The eastern mentality of these warriors is bound to drive any European strategist to despair anyway. In our excursion to Afghanistan we were able to establish that the so-called free territories were expanding and were being bothered less and less by the Soviet invaders.

It was an evening full of atmosphere in Aserre. The bold figures of the mujahedin could be seen in their evening prayers against the background of the sulfur-yellow sky. The rocky valley reverberated with the neighing of the horses and the braying of the donkey, of which the Prophet Muhammad, according to a "hadith," is supposed to have said that it was the ugliest sound in all creation.

Before we fell asleep amid the smoke of our tea hut, surrounded by swarms of fleas, Amin translated for us the song which we could hear from the camp fire:

"Grab your machinegun, thus worshipping the blood of our martyrs. Destroy the palaces of the oppressors, for you will win with Allah's help. Annihilate the party of the devil."

From Aserre we went downhill through deep gorges in the direction of the locality of Asrow. Here the land was more densely populated. The loam castles erected by the Pushtun tribe of the Mangal with their cold architecture recalled the "Ksur" of the Grand Atlas of Morocco. A strange uniformity of the Islamic world from the extreme Maghrib to the extreme Mashriq [east] revealed itself here.

Multicolored flags were fluttering above individual graves, indicating that "shuhada," fallen warriors of the holy war, had been buried here. Next to every new group of mujahedin moving in both directions, northwest and southeast, we encountered refugees seeking asylum in Pakistan from the Russian bombings.

They were carrying only sparse possessions. "These are the alleged feudal lords Radio Kabul keeps reporting on in its propaganda broadcasts," Wali said.

The sun was at its height when we reached the Valley of Janohel. Compared with our previous accommodation, this resting place made an almost delightful impression, recalling the description of paradise in the Koran--"gardens crossed by rushing brooks."

Our standards had also become quite modest, and the mulberries, called "tut" by the Afghans, seemed delicious to us despite the fact that they were still yellow and unripe. Abdul-Wadud had had some tea, a little mutton and flat bread called "nan" prepared for us.

We were camping right next to a simple whitewashed mosque built of loam. It was Friday, and Abdul-Wadud's warriors were preparing for the big prayers and the sermon--the "khutba."

Previously some children of the village, which too had been bombed, had led us to a couple of duds--powerful Russian bombs whose steel casings stuck in the loam. The village youngsters had fun throwing rocks at these highly explosive monsters.

At 1300 hours the mujahedin gathered for prayers. The prayer leader and preacher was Abdul-Wadud. He was embodying the ideal Islamic warrior's image, the "amir al-muminim." He was spiritual leader, military commander and the supreme political authority.

During his prayers, instead of the traditional "sword of Islam" ("sayf al-islam") he was holding a Kalashnikov--the way it had first been demonstrated in Tehran by Ayatollah Taleghani.

The fierce Uzbeks and Tajiks were immersed in devout prayers. Abdul-Wadud addressed his sermon to his followers in Dari:

"You are the most fortunate men on earth. There are only two glorious roads open to you: either you survive as victors and will be highly honored as "ghazi," or you die as martyrs of the faith, as "shuhada," and will be admitted to a place of honor in paradise."

He then expounded on how only a belief in Allah enabled one to wage this fight, because only a devout Muslim could dare challenge the immense power of the Soviet Union.

During the "khutba" the Uzbek subaltern leader, whom we called Genghis Khan because of his wild exterior, rose to quote aloud a verse of the Koran:

"If anyone says that the dead who die on the road of Allah are dead, he is mistaken. They are alive; only you do not know that they are."

After these pious proceedings we lay down for siesta. Sound engineer Helmut Walter had lent me his "Walkman" with cassette. It was an indescribable experience suddenly and unexpectedly to hear the solemn sounds of the Tannhaeuser overture in this wilderness. When the trombones made their powerful entrance, I caught myself singing at full voice, "Im Kreuz ist Heil" [our salvation lies in the cross]—which fortunately none of our Afghan friends understood.

In the afternoon the mujahedin staged a combat exercise for our cameras. In actual combat we would not have been able to film anything anyway but would have had to seek cover from the Soviet helicopters. But even this demonstration was impressive.

Despite the fact that we knew that the partisans were lying in wait for an attack, it took us quite a while to discover them behind the rocks.

Measured by Vietnamese conditions, which are used so often for comparison, the mountain world of the Hindu Kush with its incredible crevasses and its proliferating system of caves provides even better hiding places than the Indochinese jungle, where living conditions were fairly intolerable even for the North Vietnamese—as we knew from first-hand experience—and where the malaria rate among the "Bodoi" often was about 30 percent.

What surprised us was the firing descipline of the checkered Afghan force. Abdul-Wadud had given strict instructions that there should be no waste of ammunition. If there was some frequent and enthusiastic firing nevertheless, it was an indication that there no longer were any acute supply problems as far as ammunition was concerned.

The partisans moved along the rocky slope with the agility of mountain goats despite the fact that most of them wore only ordinary torn and utterly worn out shoes without socks. Even in the winter, they told us, they had no better shoes in which to move around in the snow; all this did was to increase their speed, they said.

In reply to a question of mine Abdul-Wadud said that the military training of his men was, relatively speaking, so satisfactory because a great number of officers of the former Afghan Army had joined the mujahedin and saw to it that there was systematic instruction.

By way of a festive high point we were treated to a performance of an equestrian game called "Buskashi." This crude event is extremely popular, particularly in northern Afghanistan. In it, the riders of the steppe fight for a dead goat, often suffering serious falls and accidents because everyone of these daring nomads would like to be the best "khapandots" (the most daring rider).

At our game things proceeded relatively harmlessly. The packhorses were ill suited to wild tests of strength. Nevertheless we felt a whiff of the reckless abandonment of this central Asian men's world constantly directed toward tests of strength.

Our Commander Abdul-Wadud turned out to be an excellent rider and born "khapandots."

At night we slept in the mosque at the foot of the prayer niche of the "mihrab," which probably represented a special honor for us nonbelievers.

Abdul-Wadud had advised us against continuing on our way northwest with his force. We would find it difficult to get food for our animals. After the bombing of the Tesin Pass we would probably have to cross completely impassable terrain, and above all there would be no opportunity to take pictures of the Kabul-Jalalabad road during daylight since we would have to cross it in great haste at night.

The departure of the mujahedin originally had been set for 0430 hours, the time of the morning prayer. Suddenly instructions were changed however, with the departure taking place at 0200 hours. It took this force of about 300 men only a quarter of an hour to be completely ready to move on.

It took us much longer to load our packhorses and start on our return trip, with a small escort, in the opposite direction. I did not want to await the dawn in Janoshel. The day before there had been so much noise and shooting that we seriously had to expect Soviet helicopters to turn up. The dark was our best protection.

On the way back I now looked so derelict that I often was stopped by elderly men who wanted to converse with me in Pushtu of Dari. In a laborious climb we again reached the resting place of Aserre, camped around the obligatory "samovar" and with the help of our interpreter Amin talked about the problems of Islam.

Even the quite simple mujahedin turned out to be amazingly well informed about events in neighboring Iran and in the Arab world. Our most reliable bodyguard was a small but robust Hazarah, a Mongol from near Kabul named Dawud.

Because of my Koran sayings, he had become particularly fond of me. We discussed the reasons why the Hizb-e Eslami fundamentalists were refusing to seek effective assistance against the Russians from the Americans.

This is, however, a question of principle, almost a theological question. The statement of those professing Islam, "la ilaha illa allah" (there is no god except God), is applied consistently to politics. Any in any way different sort of subordination or even merely leaning on a superpower would, as it were, look like treason against the principle according to which God is greater than anything else-"allahu akbar."

There is great support among the Afghan mujahedin for the movement of the Muslim brothers in the Arab area. On the other hand, the Syrian Ba'th regime of President Hafiz al-Asad is described as godless, as a satellite of the Soviet Union, even as an actual accomplice of Israel.

Above all, I was impressed by the basic egalitarian attitude of this movement, even though it rejects the term "socialist." Amin quoted a verse of the Prophet Muhammad according to which "all people are equal like the teeth of a comb."

On that day we were on the move for 15 hours, by foot or on horseback. One can imagine the extent of our exhaustion when we arrived in Laredar again. From now on we were only guarded in a minor way, and the risk of a clash or plumder increased.

Nevertheless we did not feel threatened for a second, for our bodyguards, particularly the student Kais and the Mongol Dawud, considered it a matter of honor to get us back safe and sound. In the tribal area of the Jerji there were tensions vis-a-vis the population below the surface, which our escort tried to keep secret from us, without our failing to notice their nervousness.

After some difficult stages we finally reached the destroyed Afghan border fort again. On the pass leading to the Pakistani locality of Teremengal stood a single Pakistani soldier. We had separated into small groups of two or three men, and the guard scrutinized with amazement and distrust the strange figures approaching him.

In Teremangal we were lodged again, as discreetly as possible, in the local tshaykhana. There dubious figures gathered around us, scrutinizing us suspiciously. As we learned later, they also included a couple of Pakistani secret policemen. Understandably Amin's statement that we were travelers from Nuristan met with skepticism.

We were in a hurry to get away from Teremangal, for the mood among the local Pushtuns was unpleasant. Under a poster honoring Khomeyni, it came to violent political confrontions. When things were got ready for the overnight accommodations, we sensed to the were in a highly homosexual environment. Suddenly the lofty atmosphere of holy war had turned into a "Midnight Express" climate.

With their usual efficiency Amin and Wali had come up with a bus full of mujahedin among whom we submerged. Owing to our stubble and our dirty clothing we now looked far more credible. Like a tabernacle, the vehicle had been lined with silver foil on the inside.

The Pakistani checks were stricter than they had been in the other direction because the Islamabad security authorities were afraid lest the armed opposition against the regime of President Zia-ul-Haq--particularly supporters of the executed former head of state Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto--infiltrate agents and saboteurs of the dissolved Pakistan People's Party from Afghanistan.

At the Hizb-e Eslami headquarters in Fakirabad, we finally parted with our faithful Afghan guardian angels and friends with the traditional kisses and genuine emotion.

In the immediate proximity of Teremangel, the Hizb-e Eslami presented us with a special surprise. Dr Karim, an Afghan doctor practicing in Osnabrueck, who had organized our expedition from the start, arranged for a couple of members of the Soviet Armed Forces taken prisoner by the mujahedin to come before us.

One was a Russian sergeant from near Perm in the Urals, who reportedly had left his outfit near Bagram and in the first few days had been afraid of being killed by his Afghan guards. Now he made quite a confident impression again. His name was Yuriy Grigoryevich Povarnizin. His statements were not very revealing, probably because of a lack of knowledge of the language on the part of our interpreter.

The gray-haired bearded editor-in-chief of the journal SHAHADA named Sediki, despite the fatherly way he handled the two prisoners, was unable to produce a clear statement. But Povarnizin did compare the Societ action in Afghanistan to the facist agression against the Soviet Union in World War II.

The second Soviet Army man was a Turkman named Yaskuliyev, whose first name--Muhammadgul--showed him to be a Muslim. He described himself as a deserter.

Whereas Povarnizin had fallen into the mujahedin's hands near Bagram, Yaskuliyev had changed sides near Sharikar along the road leading to the Salang Pass.

This presented additional proof that in that area too, considered a nuclear area of the spread of Soviet power in Afghanistan, the mujahedin are moving around without being bothered much and are rendering sizable stretches of land insecure.

The Turkman Yaskuliyev complained about having been maltreated by the Russian superiors in his unit. "I was beaten frequently," he said, "as happens with wives in our country." He now wanted to take part in the holy war and, after some hesitation, said that the Islamic revolution would also spread to the Muslim peoples in Soviet Central Asia.

Both Soviet prisoners refused my offer--agreed to by the Afghans--to transmit letters to their families through the Soviet Red Cross.

The first evening after our arrival in Peshawar we spent in a hospitable house of this capital of the Pakistan Northwest Region, with honorary German Consul Rudolf von Przyborowski. He was a "Golonel Blimp" type. The most interesting guest was a high Pakistani security representative in charge of surveillance over the entire border, from the Chinese Sinkiang to Baluchestan.

"We are faced with an amazing and shocking fact," said the border commissioner.
"The Russians are losing their partisan war in Afghanistan, because if one does not suppress such a guerrilla force through total military and political superiority, one loses in the end."

He asserted that "world public opinion and the Western media, however, are not taking cognizance of this development. Perhaps there is a tacit winking agreement between the two superpowers in the East and West to keep the Islamic revolution under control and deny it the publicity it deserves."

8790

CSO: 4620/10

GULBUDDIN'S BAND TO BE TRIED FOR TERRORISM

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, July 27 (Bak htar)—More facts have been brought to light by the security authorities regarding the interrogation of terrorists of counter-revolutionary ringles der Gulbuddin's band, who were arrested recently.

In a statement, the security authorities said:

As our compatriots know, some time ago a large number terrorists and assassins connected with Gulbuddin's band were captured together with important documents connected undeniably with spying and counter-revolution organisation in Kabul city and the provinces in operations launched by security forces.

They have been under interrogation, in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of the DRA and revolutionary legality.

In the course of interrogation, in consonance with tenets of the law, a number of them were detained.

The leader of the group was Hamidullah, who, with false and counterfeit identity cards, under false names and in different disguise, secretly carried on his counter-revolutionary and terroristic activities. Earlier he had fled to Pakistan and had spent some time with Gulbuddin to avoid the attention of the security authorities.

Later, however, he returned to Afghanistan to resume his subversive and criminal activities against the people, under the instruction of his masters-the blackest reactionary circles in Pakistan and the US—the CIA.

He was unware that, since the moment he returned to this country, he had been under surveillance of the patriots and alert security forces

for further information on his links with terrorist and killer circles. This professional killer, unaware of the fact that he was under surveillance, made an attempt a few nights ago on the life of a 'soldier of revolution' and opened fire on him. The incident occurred Taimani-Khairkhana road. However, he was surrounded by security forces and during an armed encounter the security forces, he was shot and killed.

A search of the body revealed a pistol, important organisational and other documents which disclosed some of the links of Gulbuddin's band, led by this reactionary

element within the country, as well as the imperialist espionage network and the crimes organised and committed against the patriotic religious leaders, social and national figures and innocent people.

The terrorist groups, led by this professional killer, have been organising, for some time, subversive and terrorist acts in Kabul against innocent people. All terrorist groups, connected with acts of terror mentioned have been arrested and soon they will go on trial.

The confessions of those responsible for these acts of terror led the security forces to arrest this element. These merciless terrorists and professional killers have terrorised innocent people, leaving sons fatherless and women widows,

Some of their victims are as follows:

- Zamiruddin, a police officer.

Wali Yusufi, Deputy
 Minister for Higher and
 Vocational Education.

Khan Qarabaghi, a
 Radio-TV singer.

-Shohor, head of the Parwan Secondary School.

— Habibullah, son of Ghulam Haider, principal of the Shwaki School.

Abdul Mateen, son of Ghausuddin, Alaqadar of Ramak. Gahzni.

of Ramak, Gahzni.

— Adel Zurmati, Head of the Municipality Directorate.

— Maj Sher Aqa, —Mohammad, son of Safdar.

 Dr Akrma Osman, who was wounded and survived.

Investigation and stern surveillance are continuing in full swing in relation to the documents and evidences found with this element in order to foil the black designs of these circles related to these killer and criminal bands.

GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO UNITE

TA230649 London BBC World Service in English 0600 GMT 23 Aug 81

[Report from: "Radio Newsdesk"]

[Text] Attempts to unite the various guerrilla groups opposed to the Soviet backed government in Afghanistan are gathering momentum. The first meeting of a new organization, which it is hoped will bring together the guerrillas, has been held in Peshawar, in Pakistan's northwest frontier. Alexander Thompson sent his report from Islamabad:

[Begin Thompson recording] The latest attempt to unite the various guerrilla organizations, which use Peshawar as their headquarters, comes after some 5 months of efforts by a group of concerned religious leaders and scholars who came to the city from several parts of Afghanistan. The differences between the main six organizations have, at times, affected the operations in the fields and at the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the new union a statement was issued by the senior religious scholar, (Mian Gu Sabzara), calling on the guerrillas to come together under one leadership and one flag to wage a more effective struggle. He told the various groups that they would no longer have a say in Afghanistan if they did not unite now. A temporary chairman was appointed, Professor (Rabanai) of the Jami'at-e Eslami Party. A president is expected to be chosen within the next few days. A spokesman for the Jami!at-e Eslami has said the Supreme Council also criticized attempts currently underway to form the united front of guerrillas in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. The spokesman said these are plots against the struggle inside Afghanistan. He said that this latest attempt to bring together the guerrilla organizations in Peshawar will be more successful than previous ones because it was supervised by respected religious scholars and the more time passed without unit the stronger the pressure from the people. [End recording

BATTLE NEAR GULBAHAR REPORTED

PM271124 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 27 Aug 81 p 4

[Dispatch by Balram Tandon: "Afghans in Vie-Day Battle"]

[Text] New Delhi—The Afghan Army, reinforced by elements from Soviet occupation troops, suffered substantial casualties in a recent battle round the town of Gulbahar, according to diplomatic sources in New Delhi yesterday.

The battle began when Afghan Army detachments tried to force their way out of Gulbahar into the Panjshir Valley, which is intermittently a stronghold of the Mojahedin guerrillas who oppose Soviet domination of their country.

The battle is said to have lasted from 15 to 20 August. It is not clear whether the Afghan and Soviet troops gained their objectives.

No details of casualties were available, but according to one unconfirmed report 300 Afghan troops sent out from the Kabul garrison defected to the guerrillas.

Gulbahar commands the entrance to the Panjshir Valley. Control of this strategic valley has changed hands several times in a series of battles.

The latest of these is the first since the Soviet-installed Afghan leader, Mr Babrak Karmal, announced that the Afghan Army would take the offensive.

According to reports from Kabul fighting between the ruling Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (People's) factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has meanwhile become so intense that Mr Babrak Karmal broadcast as president a special appeal for unity.

The Khalq faction, which was dominant from April 1979, is said to have launched an assassination campaign against Parcham supporters.

At least 30 people in various official capacities are reported to have been shot down in the party feud.

According to some accounts from Kabul seven court officials who had led prosecution proceedings against Pathan guerrillas or Khalq Party workers, were shot down between the end of July and last week.

NEW AFGHAN DAILY CARRIES KARMAL MESSAGE

LD192110 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1530 GMT 19 Aug 81

[Text] In accordance with the decision of the PDPA Central Committee Politburo, the national daily ANIS began publication today, 19 August, the anniversary of the restoration of our beloved country's independence as the publicity organ of the national committee of the National Fatherland Front [NFF].

Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the Revolutionary Council, sent a message to mark the beginning of publication of the ANIS daily as the publicity organ of the NFF National Committee, which was published on the first page of the first issue of this daily. The message says, among other things, that today, the first issue of ANIS as the publicity organ of the NFF—this great social fulcrum of the DRA and (?charter) of the unity of action—is being published by the will of the mill on masses of our people. The publicity organ of the NFF has great and responsible duties in defense of the people's vital interests and the Sawr Liberating Revolution, particularly its new development stage.

The message also says: the publicity organ of the NFF, representing the views and beliefs of broad sections of the people of the country, is commissioned to publish matters relevant to the situation in the country, and the history of our people's courageous struggles for justice, right and awareness.

Having stated valuable facts about the freedom-loving and anticolonial struggle of the heroic and toiling people of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal added: the publicity organ of the NFF must be able not only to indicate the goals, interests and demands of the masses, but to play a suitable role in coordinating the masses, and equipping them with faith and belief in independence, right, justice and freedom. The publicity organ of the NFF should accomplish its great role in the daily increasing (?trend) toward the unity of national and patriotic forces in defense of the irreversible revolutionary gains of our people, which are a vital historical necessity.

The message also adds: the publicity organ of the NFF does not have only the heavy task of enlightening the views of the masses of people and of publicizing revolutionary and humane thinking, it should also create an organized [word indistinct] system for presenting the facts of our society and revolution, and rejecting the fabrications of our enemies. Every reader and every toiling compatriot with feeling and a conscience will not only find a clear reflection of his interests in the issues of ANIS, but by studying the ANIS publication, will be equipped with logical reasoning for defending facts.

Babrak Karmal added: In the present situation and circumstances, when the pledged and conscientious thinkers and preachers of our homeland have great tasks to accomplish, the liberating Sawr revolution in its new development stage has provided extensive opportunities for implementing their patriotic and responsible duties. I hope the ANIS workers will be able, by providing these extensive and various opportunities—the pillars of which rest on the unbreakable will of the people—to fulfill their duties with creativeness.

The first issue of ANIS, which was published today in honor of the country's independence anniversary, and other dailies of the country, prints on page 1 a photograph of His Excellency Chazi Amanollah Khan, in whose reign the heroic and courageous people of Afghanistan gained their independence. Alongside the news and information, the daily prints a number of photographs of our country's leaders.

The editorial of the first issue of the publicity organ of the NFF is devoted to the transformation of the daily as the publicity organ of the NFF. The article notes the importance and role of the NFF in coordinating the patriotic and national forces for building a new and prosperous society. It adds: the ANIS daily, which from now on has a heavy task as the publicity organ of the NFF National Committee in enlightening the views of the broad masses and creating a sincere atmosphere among them, will take part in further enlightening the views of our people with the help and support of our toiling people.

The daily will expose the crimes of regional and domestic reaction who collaborate with world-devouring American imperialism against our people, homeland and revolution.

The editorial concludes: The daily will endeavour to further strengthen the spirit of brotherhood and equality between all the people of Afghanistan. This spirit fortunately exists at the moment, too.

CSO: 4665/8

BRIEFS

REBELS REPORT ARMY OFFENSIVE—Islamabad, 26 Aug (AFP)—The Afghan Army, backed by Soviet artillery and air cover, has launched an offensive in three northern provinces to flush out guerrillas from areas close to the Soviet Union, rebel sources said today. The assault, which began last Thursday, was aimed at rebel concentrations in Takhar, Baghlan and Parwan Provinces, Hezbe Islami leader Younis Khalis said. It was supported by at least 21 Soviet aircraft and helicopters, he added. The assault on rebel positions in Baghlan was among the heaviest during the past several months, the rebels said. Some 1,000 regular Afghan Army paratroopers tried to encircle rebel positions around Baghlan mountainsides, they added, but one unit was under siege by guerrillas in the Daman Ghori area north of Kabul. The rebel sources also claimed to have damaged 11 Soviet tanks with plastic explosives, and to have shot down one low-flying helicopter during the offensive. Meanwhile, the Afghan Army has increased its propaganda offensive by dropping leaflets in Farsi promising that "enemies of the revolution" will be crushed. [Text] [BK261657 Hong Kong AFP in English 1647 GMT 26 Aug 81]

MINORITY LANGUAGE BOOKS, PROGRAMMING--Kabul, 27 Aug (BAKHTAR)--The victory of the National Democratic April Revolution and its new evolutionary phase provided vast grounds for the deep socioeconomic and political changes in our country. Among other things work is being done for the language, literature, art and culture of all nationalities to develop and flourish and wide strikes is taken in this aspect on the basis of revolutionary guidelines of the DRA. The establishment of the departments of Uzbeky, Turkmen and Baluch languages in the framework of the department of the compilation and translation of the Ministry of Education for the compiling of textbooks in these languages was the very basic work which began with the completion of textbooks for the first and second grade students. This for the first time enabled the children of these nationalities to study in their mother tongues. Programmes were made in radio and television for those nationalities and the cultural side was brought about more effectively to meet the peoples needs. YOLDOZE, GORASH and SOB are the weeklies which are published respectively in Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluch languages. [Text] [LD280610 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0434 GMT 28 Aug 81]

MAS'UD RAJAVI ON ALLIANCE WITH BANI-SADR

LD150153 London BBC Television Network in English 2200 GMT 14 Aug 81

["Exclusive interview" with Mas'ud Rajavi, Mojahedin-e Khalq leader, conducted by Sally Hardcastle on 14 August near Paris--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Why did you leave Iran?

[Answer] If you know, our people in Iran are under the dictatorship of Khomeyni regime, a very reactionary bloodthirsty and deceiver regime. For instance, within the past 45 days more than 400 of my brothers and sisters have been executed and this figure is the figure declared formally by the regime. Between these brothers and sisters, you can find young girls between 9 and 12 years, some women with babies in their stomach.

[Question] But if this is all happening, surely it would be better for you to stay in there and continue to lead the resistance.

[Answer] Of course. We could stay there. But I will tell why now I am here. After Khomeyni shut all the newspapers and made a very hard dictatorship, the world was not informed exactly what is happening inside Iran. Then, after he deposed President Bani-Sadr, the president wrote a letter for me for organizing the national resistance movement.

[Question] But why did you join Bani-Sadr? Because after all, it is said that he is as responsible as Khomeyni for what is happening Iran?

[Answer] I am not the special advocate for all the life and all the motions of President Bani-Sadr, but let me tell you that the plan we reached together is just a plan. The president is not ready to be before Khomeyni. It means that he could be a president just now and have the best possibilities. But he protested the dictatorship, and we are very glad just now that he is with us and we are with him—both against dictatorship—for making an independent and free Iran.

[Question] We had news today that General Ariana, leading some ex-soldiers from the Iranian army, has taken a gunboat and is preparing perhaps to go into Iran and perhaps to join up with the army. Now how would your movement react to that? I mean, would they support him in any way? How would they react to it?

[Answer] No. These are originally and basically different lines. Our people, and of course we, do not want to come back to the past times. We are forces for future.

[Question] But I know that both you and Bani-Sadr are very religious and Islamic, and many of the criticisms of the current regime is that it is Islam that has caused many of the problems, why should you be any different?

[Answer] Of course we are Muslims and we demand that he is Muslim! But the content of our Islam is absolutely different with him because we believe in democracy; we believe in real independence; we believe in the rights of the different strata of the people. Let me tell you an example. For example, you know when we came here they were telling on the radio and TV that we have come by wearing the clothes of women. You know why they tell this? Because in their reactionary ideology, the clothes of women is a bad thing, not respectful. But for me, even if it was necessary, I was very proud to wear the clothes of women. So I think it is [word indistinct] made especially for you.

[Question] You are now with Bani-Sadr. Are you partners, or when you get to Iran will he be president and you will be second in command? Or, will you be president and he be second in command? How does it work?

[Answer] He is the president and as he wrote to me, just now I am responsible for organizing the resistance and in future making a committee for governing the affairs of the country, for administrating the affairs of the country.

[Question] And you are part of that?

[Answer] Yes.

CSO: 4600/148

KPD ORGAN DEFENDS TUDEH STAND, CRITICIZES BANI-SADR

Duesseldorf UNSERE ZEITUNG in German 29 Jun 81 p 4

[What Is Behind the Disputes in Iran? Latest Declarations of the Communist Tudeh Party; Answer to a Reader's Question]

[Text] Question: "We read daily about the vehement disputes in Iran. What is involved? Why was President Bani-Sadr deposed?" asks our reader Martina Lehmann from Gelsenkirchen.

Answer: Our paper has continuously presented brief reports by news agencies about the developments in Tehran. Now it is in possession of statements by the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh Party. A declaration of the central committee of this party, dated early June 1981, describes the current dangerous conflict that is becoming more severe due to the Iraqi war against Iran: "The forces of large capital, or large landholding, and of all circles hit by the revolution are busily steering the popular masses away from the basic aims of the revolution, defined by the overthrow of the life-threatening rule of universal imperialism led by U.S. imperialism, to pave the way for a return of imperialist rule through a civil strife within Iranian society. They exploit all faults, deficiencies, weaknesses and errors."

"With joint and united efforts we must overcome this conspiracy just like the last one," the Tudeh central committee continues, at the same time criticizing the government and the parliamentary majority who are opposed to a decisive struggle and the unit of the revolutionary forces. The hampering of the Tudeh Party is also attacked. "Our party strongly protests the unjust and illegal prohibition of the NAMEH MARDOM, the main organ of the Iranian Tudeh Party, simultaneously with the prohibiting of newspapers dependent on conciliatory organizations of liberal capitalism that have consciously embarked on a line aimed at weakening the revolution and the Islamic republic." This ban, however, will not sway Tudeh from its principled and revolutionary position.

Maintain the Imam's Line

The Tudeh Party also warns of serious mistakes by forces who claim to defend the revolution and its institutions, declaring in a proclamation dated 12 June 1981: Such groups may be able "to achieve a brief victory over their opponents, but over the long run they themselves will become a great danger to the basic laws of the

society, since the enemy can achieve its treacherous plan with exactly the same methods." In its proclamation the Tudeh Party advocates the maintenance of "the determining anti-imperialist and popular line of Imam Khomeyni. This line, being the expression of the most important demands of the millions of underprivileged of our society, is completely supported by all revolutionary forces, from the true fighters of Islam to the true adherents of scientific socialism." This line led to the victory of the Iranian revolution and shook the foundations of the rule of world imperialism in the Gulf region. The latter is now busy "helping the revolutionary countries of Iran and Afghanistan to achieve an imperialist stability."

With this aim in mind imperialism is attempting to "achieve the destruction of the Islamic republican system from inside," splintering the popular forces up to fratricidal strife by exploiting conspiracies in distant areas of the country (Kurdistan, etc.).

Willingly or unwillingly, the proclamation of the Tudeh Party states, this splintering is fostered by forces such as: the "American-Chinese groupings," "Maoists converted to Islam," the "compromising front of the capitulationists of liberal capitalism" (such as the National Front and the "Liberation movements" celebrated by Western bourgeois media, as well as the "coordination bureau" of the now deposed President Bani-Sadr) as well as left extremist adventurists such as the "Mojahedin Khalq" and dominant forces within the mass media. Lastly, "dubious groups and persons are pressing the people under the title of 'Hezbollah' (Party of God), claiming to defend the historical decisions of Imam Khomeyni."

Such groups and their activities foster the attempts of the enemies of the revolution. For that reason the Tudeh Party urges especially the youth of the country not to let itself be drawn into the adventures of these forces. The "guideposts" for a determination of one's own position should always be: Every position and action applauded by imperialist circles, capitalists dependent on foreign countries, large landholders, the "compromising liberals" and "American Maoists" is contrary to the interests of the people and the revolution. As far as the function of the state president is concerned, the Tudeh Party draws attention to its criticism of the draft constitution that provided for too much power to the directly elected president. The opinion that "the best form for the institution of popular rule is the transfer of all authority to the representatives of the people" has been proven.

Bani-Sadr Torpedoes Necessary Legislation

It is appropriate for parliament to appoint and, if necessary, to dismiss the president, to proclaim and enforce legislation. It is recalled that President Bani-Sadr rejected ministers proposed by parliament, did not sign legislation, thus preventing their implementation, even though they were of vital importance to the people. It is also recalled that the president and his circle participated since March 1981 in the exacerbation of the differences between various popular forces. Such a "diversion of the public consciousness" from important tasks helped the aggressors. Bani-Sadr, "in spite of warnings by all revolutionary forces, was unable to draw a line between himself and that front," consisting of "compromisers and capitulators to imperialism."

The Tudeh Party describes the class-conscious essence of the disputes—aside from disputes about personalities—thusly: "The main roots of the disputes are to be found among the foreign-dependent and exploiting capitalists, and the suppressing large landholders; the main initiators of these provocative disputes are the political handmaidens of one mind with these capitalists and large landholders." This "poisonous spring" would continue to be a threat as long as government and parliament leave the interests of these classes untouched.

The party calls for unity: "The interests of the revolution demand always, and especially in the current difficult situation, that each revolutionary be aimed at uniting as many forces as possible who are interested in working sincerely to further the revolution." The revolutionary forces should also not allow themselves to be separated from their friends and supporters on the international level. Finally, the Iranian communists urge: "Let us carefully examine the facts of the history of our country and the world, and let us learn from the experiences of successful and unsuccessful revolutions in other countries."

9240

CSO: 4620/7

TEHRAN RADIO ASSAILS COMPROMISING ARAB LEADERS

GF171347 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 16 Aug 81

[Unattributed commentary: "The Compromising Arab States And The Regime Occupying Jerusalem"]

[Text] According to reports issued by foreign agencies on 22 July, the Iraqi Ba'thist regime, in cooperation with the imperialists, paid \$200,000 to (Alfred Proggi) in Zurich through an Iraqi known as S'adi Hamdun to draw up and publish a number of false certificates and documents. These false documents were to claim that the Iranian government had purchased arms from the Zionist regime and transferred them to Tehran. (Proggi) complied with the wish of his patrons and prepared the documents alleging that Iran had purchased military equipment and spare parts from Tel Aviv totaling 17 million pounds sterling and transferred them from Tel Aviv to Tehran in an Iranian military Boeing transport aircraft in the course of three flights. (Proggi) was told to publish the said documents through the sold-out West European press and broadcasting media which are bribed by Baghdad. Meanwhile, hearing about the crash of an Argentinian aircraft in the Soviet Union, the said individual hastened to allege that the aircraft was ferrying arms between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

According to authentic documents, the Argentinian plane was transferring cargo from Cyprus to Tehran--cargo that was purchased by Iran from three Eucopean countries and shipped to Cyprus via Scotland.

The compromising Arab states in general and the Iraqi Ba'thist regime in particular have moved in cooperation with the imperialists to exploit this state of affairs through misleading and false propaganda with a view to disrupting the unity and cohesion between Iranian Muslims and the Arabs, particularly between the Iranian Muslims and their Muslim brethern living in the occupied land of Palestine. The move was also aimed at encouraging Muslims to adopt a negative stand against the Iranian Islamic Republic.

Taking this stand of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime into consideration, can one describe it as an enemy of Zionism? Our listeners will recall that foreign news agencies reported on 1 July that a ship carrying arms to Iraq ran aground off the Strait of Tiran. The ship was rescued with the help of the Zionist Regime and seen off to the Port of Aqaba where it was to unload the arms it carried. The arms were bound for Iraq via Jordan. The transport of those arms has probably been completed by now.

Is it possible for any honorable and reputable Muslim Arab to state that he has no knowledge about the arms Egypt has delivered to Iraq, the effective role Cairo plays in the betrayal of the objectives of the Palestinians and the anti-Islamic policies of Saddam and al-Sadat? Following al-Sadat's statement on 31 March that he had sold arms to Iraq worth \$35 million, it became obvious that the arms in question were those captured by the Zionists during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1974. Israel gave the arms to al-Sadat as a present and he later handed them over to Iraq to be used against Iranian Muslims and the region.

What is more interesting in the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear installations by Israel. This incident strengthened Iraq's position within Arab nationalism against the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It was actually a cause for widespread propaganda for securing the support of the Arab states and other Muslim countries for the Iraqi Ba'thist regime.

The compromising leaders of the Arab states—that is to say, the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—and those of France and the United States were well informed of the exact date and time of the raid on the Baghdad nuclear installations. According to reports from Japan, on the day of the bombing of the Baghdad nuclear installations, Saddam al-Tikriti issued an order to the Iraqi antiaircraft command not to open fire on any aircraft that day. The order said Saudi and Jordanian aircraft would be carrying out joint exercises in Iraqi airspace.

It will be recalled that after the bombing of the installations, Western news agencies reported that the 16 Israeli military aircraft that attacked Baghdad reached their target by crossing Saudi and Jordanian airspace.

An interesting point is that the U.S. AWACS, which are at the disposal of the Saudi Sultanate, established the flight and the target of the Israeli aircraft at the time of the attack and reported the incident. The Iraqi Ba'thist regime has not reacted to this report in any way.

CSO: 4654/139

IRAN

BRIEFS

BAHONAR RECEIVES TURKISH AMBASSADOR--16 August--The Turkish ambassador to Tehran was received by Prime Minister Doctor Bahonar yesterday. At this meeting Doctor Bahonar said the following in reply to the congratulatory message delivered by the ambassador on the occasion of his election as the prime minister: We expect our revolution to be respected as one that is authentic and based on the people, and not on either the East or the West, and that it is composed of Islamic [as heard]. While insisting on maintaining the policy of neither East nor West, we uphold the view that the ties between the people of the region and the superpowers be severed, that these peoples progress within the framework of close relations on the basis of full independence, and that the economic needs of the Islamic states should be met by Islamic countries.

[Text] [GF171357 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 17 Aug 81]

CSO: 4654/139

WEST BANK ARABS REPORT ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15, 18 Jun 81

[15 Jun 81 p 23]

[Text] Settlement, and the Israeli Theory of Security. What Is the Secure Border for the Settlements in the Ghawr Area of the Jordan Valley As Defined by Israel's New Plan?

The Zionist Settlement Offices have published the latest map of their settlement plans for the West Bank during the next 5 years in accordance with that is in the settlement development plan for the occupied West Bank which has been prepared by Matityahu Drobles, the head of the Settlement Office in the government of the Zionist enemy.

In a special report which AL-DUSTUR has obtained from the occupied territories it is said the Drobles's plan has the objective of relocating at least one-third of the Arab inhabitants during the next 5 years, that is, by 1985. According to the plan it will also be attempted to bring in new Jewish i ligrants whom the Jewish Agency and Zionist organizations intend to entice and invite to what they call the "promised land."

The report, which was prepared by a group of Arab engineers in the occupied territories, also said that the policy of establishing Zionist settlements has the objective of geographically encircling Arab population centers and then beginning to economically close them off in addition to curtaining their defense capabilities in the future in case the Arab inhabitants mount any rebellion against Zionist occupation. The enemy is selecting locations which overlook the cities and large villages as places to set up his settlements. Concerning the type of settlements being set up in the occupied city of Jerusalem, the report says that the enemy has resorted to the method of encircling the Holy City with Jewish residential areas which will serve as fortresses and [centers of] war materiel. The report says that the enemy right now is hard at work trying to induce Jewish immigrants to settle in these residential areas and is offering them considerable incentives in an attempt to increase the number of Jewish inhabitants in the Holy City—especially in the part populated by the Arabs.

The report also mentions the fact that the Zionist enemy is not publishing the actual figures concerning the number of settlements being set up in the occupied

Arab territories because the Zionists want to minimize Arab and international anxiety concerning their settlement policy. For example, the total number of Zionists settlements which had been established in the occupied West Bank by the end of 1980 was about 102. This figure is much larger than the one published by the the official Israeli government offices. Furthermore, more than 20,000 settlers live in the settlements.

The report also brings out the fact that the settlement process is linked to what is called "Israeli security." From the Zionist point of view, any line of settlements which is erected requires another line of settlements to the east of it in order to protect it. Thus the settlements which have been established in the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley require, from the Israeli point of view, another line of settlements to be established to the east of it. Perhaps this latter line of settlements will be to the east of the Jordan River in order to protect the line of settlements which have been set up in the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley, in an area close to the river.

The report also warned of the consequences of underestimating the importance of this settlement process of the Drobles's plan which aims at establishing hundreds of settlements by the end of 1985 and which has the objective of clearing the occupied territories of their legitimate Arab inhabitants.

In addition to this, information which has come to us from the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman tells us that the total area of Arab land which had been confiscated by the end of 1980 was 1,736,913 dunams, in addition to 150,000 dunams which were seized, at the end of 1980, from lands belonging to the town of Abu Dis, east of Jerusalem.

Mr Najib al-Ahmad, chief of the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman, has translated into Arabic the information on the map prepared by Matityaho Drobles, the head of the Settlement Office in the government of the Zionist enemy. This map shows the density of settlements which the enemy intends to set up during the next 5 years. It also shows proposed roads, residential areas, and areas and locations for settlements—and thus makes it clear that this is intended to be a process of total take—over of the land in the West Bank. This confirms the information which came in the report from the occupied territories concerning the enemy's plan to move the Arab inhabitants out of their cities and villages and to install Jewish settlers in their place.

AL-DUSTUR has also learned that this map, accompanied by a report concerning the operations of erecting Zionist settlements, will be distributed to all interested Arab government bodies and to all the Arab ambassadors in Jord n.

[18 Jun 81 p 16]

[Text] In His Report About Settlement in the Occupied Territories, the Head of the Settlement Division Says: "We Will Never Give Up the West Bank."

There Is Insufficient Israeli Military Presence West of the Jordan River.

The Settlements Are Vital for Israel's Security!

The Report Emphasizes Israel's Permanent Objective of Maintaining Borders Far Away From Its Population and Economic Centers.

Last Monday AL-DUSTUR already published the latest Israeli settlement map which was prepared by Matityaho Drobles, the head of the Jewish Agency, the head of the Settlement Division, and member of the Likud party. This map showed that the Zionists have expansionist intentions and have in mind to seize Arab lands, cities, and villages in the occupied teriitories.

Along with the map we published the cautionary report which was prepared by a group of Arab engineers in occupied Palestine and which concerned the settlement process. Recently AL-DUSTUR obtained the report which Matityaho Drobles himself prepared. In this report he emphasizes that there is not the lightest doubt that Israel fully intends to take over the territories where the map shows that settlements will be established. Drobles says: "We have no intention of ever giving up control over the West Bank." Mr Najib al-Ahmad, head of the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman, has prepared a report about Drobles and his ideas concerning the settlements which have been published by the Zionist media. This report is being distributed to interested Arab circles. The following is some of what is contained in the report: The Present Status Concerning Settlements in the West Bank From what Zionist government offices have published concerning Drobles' settlement plan we have learned that as of the date that this plan was made public, that is, in September of 1980, 44 settlements had either been established in the West Bank or were in the process of being established. A total of 21 of these settlements are collective settlements, 12 of them are municipal settlements, 3 are agricultural villages, 3 are kibbutzes, 3 are industrial villages, and there is 1 district center and 1 industrial center. Of the settlements, 35 have already been established and [the others] have been in the process of being established in the West Bank during the last 3 years, that is, since 1977. The number of Jewish inhabitants in these settlement areas is now about 10,000.

Most of the settlements in the West Bank are of the village-collective type. Collective settlements are a relatively new type of settlement. Settlements such as these are geared to absorbing about 300 families in order to make it possible to develop a type of life which intensely religious, productive, and of a village nature to accommodate a closed society. This will enable the creation of an exceptionally good type of life, with a very high level of services -- to a greater degree than what is found in broader and more open societies in municipal settlements which are similar as far as their economic level is concerned. In this closed society there emerge aspects of mutual cooperation and the ability to make the fundamental decisions which are necessary for the small closed society, which is found in a collective settlement, in order to put forth greater efforts and in order to preserve the particular nature of the settlement. All of the members of every collective settlement are organized in a cooperative union. Joining the union requires the approval of the village settlement absorption organizations, and this includes approval by the Absorption Committee which is composed of representatives from the Settlement Office and the settlement movement which the nucleus belongs to as well as a representative from the settlement. Each candidate is evaluated

in accordance with the conditions which have been set in accordance with the nature of the settlement, the union organization, and the type of nucleus which establishes the settlement. All of this done in order to guarantee coordination among the members of the settlement, and this is the first necessary condition for the effective work which is to be done by a small settlement. The union is responsible for municipal services such as establishing parks, building roads, collecting garbage setting up the water supply system, etc., as well as social services such as education, health, and social affairs, and also cultural, social, and recreational activities. The union also provides aid to the members of the settlement in the economic and production realm by providing them with financing and by marketing their products. The union also preserves the distinctive nature of its settlement.

The Settlement Office provides aid by means of financing general and fundamental investments in collective settlements and also provides aid such as long-term loans in accordance with the teachings and bylaws followed in the village settlements. Production activities in a settlement are carried on by the members or by groups of members, and they are responsible for them. The Settlement Office, from its own supply of capital, provides the necessary financing for investments for production plants which are set up by the members or by groups of members, in accordance with the settlement's system. This aid is given only to union members who are permanent residents in the settlement and who work in the same plant, and only after the feasibility of their project has been studied and the authorities in the [Settlement] Office have approved it.

It should be mentioned that in spite of the fact that the settlement's means of production are still based on a relatively small [production] capacity, the settlers do earn their living from this and the social situation in most of the settlements is a good one. Furthermore, the atmosphere is friendly, warm, and full of intensive cultural and social activities. This means then that most of the settlements which have been established in the West Bank are strong settlements which are active and hard at work.

"At first we had to overcome numerous problems, but it was not long at all before the settlements were able to stand on their own feet, with the help of relatively small-scale investments. At first we had to bring water to the settlements only by means of water tanks at a time when almost all of the settlements were getting their water by means of a system of water pipes. And in some places, such as Qadumim and Shilo, wells had to be dug. The appropriate operations for founding the settlements were carried out, and soon all of the settlements in the West Bank will be linked by a regional electric power network. In many settlements they have already begun to lay the foundations for putting up permanent structures which will then be built on the basis of the approach 'Build your own house yourself.'"

Details Concerning Four Settlements

Below are the details concerning four collective settlements in the occupied West Bank, and they serve to illustrate the pattern of the rest of the settlements:

1. Ofra.

This was the first settlement in the West Bank. It was established 5 years ago on

a high hill near the old town of ('Ufrah). The road to Elon and the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley runs by the foot of this hill. It also is close to the road which runs across the tops of the mountains in the southern part of the West Bank. Right now 72 families, with 300 children, live in the settlement, and together they constitute a population of 500 persons. The settlement jointly administers all of the activities which take place in it. So far 72 housing units have been set up in the settlement, and this year 10 more housing units will be put up. In addition to this, work has begun on the establishment of 50 permanent housing units. This means that, by the end of this year, about 80 families will be able to live in Ofra.

Drinking and watering places have been set up in Ofra. The Settlement Office has also planted a forest for this settlement which covers an area of 90 dunams and which, this year, will be expanded to cover between 150 and 200 dunams. This year industrial buildings were put up which cover an area of 2,100 square meters, and their purpose is to expand and provide support for currently existing factories and workshops which are housed in temporary buildings. The Settlement Office is also planning to set up four chicken farms there.

2. Beit El.

This settlement is located near the historic spot callet Bet El, next to an army camp to the right of the Ramallah-Nablus road, about 2 kilometers north of the road junction from which a road leads to the Ofra settlement, and about 20 kilometers north of Jerusalem. The Bet El settlers established their settlement in this location about 2.5 years ago, that is, in November of 1977. At the present time 65 families, with 17 children, live in this settlement, and the total population of the settlement is 300 persons. A total of 74 housing units have been set up, and approval has been obtained to set up about 50 permanent housing units in the settlement. This settlement has a grocery store, clinic, and a doctor, and soon a maternity and child care center will be opened there. It also has a library both for young people and for adults as well as a youth club and religious and cultural centers. The people in the settlement earn their living from their local jobs, district jobs, and outside jobs. The Settlement Office has put up industrial buildings in the settlement which cover an area of 660 square meters-buildings which are intended to house from three to six factories and workshops. The settlement will also soon have a filling station.

3. Qadumim.

This settlement was established 4.5 years ago, and is located next to the village of Kafr Qaddum, about 7 kilometers west of Nablus. Today there are 120 families, 360 children, 10 single people, and 60 students of religion living in this settlement. The total population is about 700 persons. The settlement has 130 housing units and 10 mobile homes. In addition to this, work has begun on the laying of the foundations for a "build your own house yourself" project in the settlement. The settlement has a central building for its synagogue, dining hall, orphanage, administrative offices, school which teaches 9 grades, and other public services. The settlement also has three chicken farms, a metal works, an insecticide factory, a jewelry workshop, a garment-making and tailoring shop, a comptroller's office, a copying office, and a paper factory.

4. Elon Moreh.

This settlement was established in January of 1980 at its present location next to the al-Kabir mountain which is located 4 kilometers east of Nablus. There are 35 families that live there, and the settlement's total population is about 200 persons. So far 41 prefabricated housing units have been set up there, in addition to 7 public buildings, a synagogue, a kindergarten, an orphanage, a school, a clinic, administrative offices, and a grocery store. The settlement has been linked to a major road, and now they are finishing the building of a road which passes by the town of Dayr al-Hatab. Factories and workshops have been set up in the settlement which cover an area of 1,200 square meters, and a blacksmith's workshop will also be set up. By the end of this year there will be about 40 families living in this area.

The West Bank Settlement Strategy

Drobles says: "Today we face a larger eastern front which includes Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These countries, which possess tremendous resources and are united in their hatred for Israel, today constitute a dangerous and continuous threat to our eastern borders. The lessons which we have learned from our recent wars have taught us that we must guarantee, for ourselves, borders which are as far away as possible from our heavily-populated industrial and economic centers which are concentrated in the coastal plain. This is so that we would have sufficient breathing space in order to be able to mobilize the reserve forces which we depend on in view of the tremendous numerical superiority which the Arab armies have. For this reason, separation of our eastern border, which extends along the Jordan River, from our population centers will contribute a great deal toward providing for all of Israel's security. But it is not enough merely to have a military presence in the areas located to the west of the Jordan River in order to guarantee the security of this sensitive area. A civilian presence, embodied in the Jewish settlements, is very vital to the 'country's security.' This is because all of the settlements in the West Bank have been established on the tops of high mountains which dominate the main artiries where it would be difficult for armored vehicles. in particular, and for vehicles, in general, to pass through. Due to the lessons learned from past wars, we have taken all the necessary steps to guarantee that the settlers in the West Bank will be well trained and well armed in order to 'defend' themselves against sudden attacks."

In his report, Drobles goes on to say:

"Thus we are now forced to run a race with time in view of the talks currently going on concerning the future of the West Bank. At that time, all the agreements will be signed in accordance with the status quo as we present it in these areas, however one assesses it. So now is a very appropriate time to begin a large-scale comprehensive settlement program, especially at the tops of the mountains of the West Bank—an area which is characterized by its uneven terrain and which controls the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley in the east and the coastal plain in the west. At this point I would like to say that there should be no doubt about the fact that our intention is to remain forever in control of the areas in the West Bank."

The West Bank Settlement Policy

Drobles elucidates his ideas by saying:

"Our experience with settlements has taught us that we should avoid creating a situation where a particular settlment is isolated in any given area. This is because of the necessity of depending on joint services with nearby settlements and because of security. For this reason, near each settlement in the Wes' Bank there should be other settlements so that there will be groups of settlements in homogeneous settlement areas."

In order to spread the settlements out, as much as possible, and in order to establish settlements which are characterized by an outstanding quality of life, most of the settlements in the West Bank which have been established, or which are now in the process of being established, are first established as settlements of the village-collective type. In the initial stage, a single such settlement has from 50 to 300 families and the establishment of the settlement depends on industry, tourism, srrvices, and intensive agriculture."

"Detailed plans for the settlement are carried out by means of creating nucleuses which are prepared to immediately settle in the settlements as they are being established."

"During the next 5 years we should establish between 12 and 15 village and municipal settlements in the West Bank every year so that, by the end of this five-year period, we will have added between 60 and 75 settlements and the number of Jewish inhabitants there will be between 120,000 and 150,000 persons."

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank

	Name of Settlement	Type of settlement	Year Established	Area
1.	Qadumim	Collective	1975	Qadumim
2.	Elon Moreh	Collective	1979	Elon Moreh
3.	Bet Horon	collective	1977	Giv'on
4.	Matityahu	collective	being established	(Mudi'in)
5.	Mevo Horon	agricultural		
		village	1970	(Mudi'in)
6.	Halmish (Neve Zuf)	collective	1977	Halmish
7.	Salit	industrial		
		village	1978	Salit
8.	Tyur	collective	1977	Shave Shomron
9.	Dotan	collective	being	
			established	Reyhan
10.	Shave Shomron	collective	1977	Shave
				Shomron
11.	Ma'ale Shomron	collective	1979	Qarne Shomron
12.	Yaqir	collective	being	
	Qarne Shomron		established	Qarne Shomron

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank (contd)

13. Bet El col	tlement Established lective 1977 lective 1977	Area Bet El
	lective 1977	Bet El
16 Witness Vendles		
14. Mitzpe Yeriho col		Adumim
15. Ofra col	lective 1975	Bet El
16. Shilo col	lective 1977	Shilo
17. Tapuah col	lective 1978	Shilo
18. Tego'a col	lective 1978	Etzion
19. El'azar ind	ustrial	
vil	lage 1977	Etzion
	butz 1963 [sic]	Etzion
21. Migdal Oz kib	butz 1977	Etzion
22. Rosh Zurim kib	butz 1975	Etzion
23. Kochav Hashahar col	lective	
(na	hal) 1977	Bet El
24. Mevo Shilo col	lective	
(na	hal) 1977	Shilo
25. Rimonim col	lective	
(na	hal) 1977	Bet El
26. Kefar Adumim col	lective 1979	Adumim
27. Reyhan agr	icultural	
vi1	lage 1979	Reyhan
28. Bet Ariv (Levona) col	lective being	
[illegible]	established	Halmish
29. Ma'ale Nahal agr	icultural	Shave
Mitzpe Giv'on vil	lage (nahal) 1979	Shomron
	lective 1980	Giv'on
31. Hannanit (Reyhan B) ind	ustrial	
	lage 1980	Reyhan

Total - 31 village settlements under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing.

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank (contd)

	Name of Settlement	Type of Settlement	Year Established	Area
32.	Qarne Shomron	municipal	1977	Qarne Shomron
33.	Qarne Shomron H	municipal (standing army)	being established	Qarne Shomron
34.	Bet El B	Bunicipal	1977	Bet El
35.	Hargilo	municipal	1968	Etzion
36.	Efrat H	municipal	being established	Etzion

	Name of Settlement	Type of Settlement	Year Established	Area
37.	Givon	municipal	1977	Giv'on
38.	Ari'el/Haris	municipal	1977	Ariel
39.	Qiryat Arba'	municipal	1968	Hebron
40.	Elkana	municipal	1977	Ariel
41.	Mishor Adumim	industrial		
		center	1975	Adumim
42.	Ma'ale Adumim	municipal	being	
		•	established	Adumim
43.	Yitav	municipal	being	
		•	established	Ariel
44.	Allon Shevut	district		
		center	1970	Etzion

Total = 13 municipal settlements under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing.

Total number of settlements = 44.

Remark: According to statistics and what has been published concerning settlement in the occupied Arab lands, the number of settlements is much greater than the number officially published in Israel. Apparently this confusion is being created for a definite reason.

9468

CSO: 4303/66

ISRAEL

FEATURES OF WESTWIND PLANE DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Jun. 81 pp 28-29

/Article by Aharon Lapidot: "The Scanners From the West"7

Text There are people on whom fate has smiled: While enjoying themselves fully, they are carrying out an important security mission. The carrying out of the mission is extremely pleasant, both because of the company they are in and the aircraft they are operating. The name of the aircraft: Sea Scan or as it is known by its more familiar name, Westwind. The Westwind, originally an executive aircraft which is produced by the Israel Aircraft Industries, is a hit in the executive aircraft market. In the American market it is in first place in total sales, and when one considers the enormous size of this market, this is no small achievement. It is also in great demand outside the United States.

Naval people have concluded that this aircraft has no equal for maritime reconnaissance: Small, jet propelled, fast, high flying--it can be used to track the movement of suspicious vessels along the coast in order to prevent the infiltration of terrorists from the sea. Westwind aircraft to the Sea Scan type have been procured for the navy.

It is true that the naval personnel are great heroes at sea. They operate their missile boats with enviable skill. But wings? The air force operates them for them. Air force pilots fly the Westwind on maritime reconnaissance missions with naval personnel on its "deck." Between patrols, they carry out other missions with this aircraft such as "jumping" Ezer Weizman (when he was minister of defense) over to Egypt.

The aircraft itself is pleasing to the eye, quiet, and charming. It does not have the bold lines of the Phantom, the beauty of the F-15, or the sophistication of the F-16. It is not long, not high, and has broad wings. The most conspicuous part is its duck bill which contains the radar. On both sides of the fuselage there are bubble windows which permit outstanding observation below, even beneath the underside.

Without Fuss

It has a three-man crew: two pilots and a navigator. In addition, it has three navy people: two observers--the pleasant company--and an identification officer whose function is to supervise the observers and identify the vessels appearing on the screen and on the water.

The temperature is 20°C, and it is such a beautiful spring day that the visibility promises to be excellent. Major T, the pilot of the aircraft, points to my seat: a folding chair without support. "Sorry, the rest of the seats are taken," he smiles at me.

Without much fuss we are moving, and after a short take-off run, we are in the air. The aircraft has a self-propulsion system, and if it malfunctions, there is a small jet auxiliary engine which operates the systems and then the generator. The ignition is automatic, and the flow of fuel to the engines during the ignition is regulated without human intervention.

The two jet engines carry us in a few minutes westward toward the sea. For a minute or two I am enraptured by this blueness, and after we stabilize in the reconnaissance track, I turn to examine the worders of the aircraft. And this is something to see.

Our host, Major T says, "This is a very advanced executive aircraft. It has dual, automatic navigation systems for all kinds of flying. The system, called very low frequency, is capable of flying the aircraft without human intervention. You feed it the reference point of your destination and the altitude at which you want to fly, and it does all the work itself: It maintains its course and altitude and executes turns. A similar system also exists in the Jumbo aircraft. Besides flying the aircraft, the system provides data such as ground speed and wind speed. "If you want to fly the aircraft yourself, you will also find out that the task is not a difficult one. The aircraft is equipped with a flight director which does not permit you to make a mistake. It alerts you to every deviation from altitude or course and provides you exactly the desired angles of turn. It also has dual communications systems, and actually almost every instrument appears twice on the control panel."

Closing a Gap

The navigator and the identification officer have discovered a vessel on the radar. The former calculates the shortest and most efficient course to it, and it appears to us in its full beauty: A large merchant ship which is moving toward the coast of Israel at a relatively high speed. We circle it. Everything is in order. We continue to fly and Major T continues: "The engines are really astounding. They are at a level which is not found in other aircraft. You can fly 10-20 sorties without the slightest problem. There has been only one case among all the Westwind aircraft which have been sold in the world in which an engine has malfunctioned in the air!

"The aircraft is pressurized (the air is at a constant pressure), and it can be flown even at the astounding altitude of 45,000 feet. The pressure of the cabin can be controlled by the pilot. The Westwind advances the naval requirements 100 years. The average speed of vessels is 15-20 knots, and we in the aircraft see a picture which for us is static. However, our very presence in the air closes a gap in the defense of our coasts. Our very reconnaissance patrol deters the terrorists, and we see everything which moves at sea."

We discover another vessel. This time a smaller one, about 2,000 tons. It is in the vicinity of Sur and is moving westward.

At this stage we have data on all the vessels in the patrol area. Major T suggests that I move to the co-pilot's seat and turns the wheel over to me. I am a pilot!

I cannot help remembering my friend, Uri 'Amit, who flies F-15's and F-16's and relates proudly about the stage when he went into a blackout and how quickly his stomach went up into his throat because of the high G force and the tight turns. Here, I am flying smoothly. The noise of the engines is virtually unheard in the cabin. As we have already said, one enjoys oneself completely.

Almost without sensing it, we have already completed the alloted time for the patrol. Major T signals me to vacate the seat for the co-pilot in preparation for the landing. Regretfully I leave the wheel and return to my seat. Who knows when I will have another opportunity to fly the Westwind?

5830

CSO: 4323/25

ISRAEL

COAL SEEN AS MAJOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCE

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 Jul 81 p 19

Article by Avraham Dishon: "By the End of This Decade Coal Will Be the Primary Energy Source of Israel_7

/Text/ It seems that at least on one issue there are no differences of opinion among the various parties: the seriousness of Israel's energy problem. Although Ya'aqov Meridor recently publicized his sensational discovery, according to which all the world's energy problems will be solved, the experts still cast doubt on the effectiveness of this discovery. Oil as the primary component of the energy economy will continue to dominate at least until the end of this decade, they say.

Recently the Ministry of Energy published an internal document, "Israel's National Energy Policy." The author of the document, Dr Yona Bar-Gur, chief of the Planning and Policy Branch in the Ministry of Energy, conducted a thorough study in order to clearly indicate the trends of the energy economy in Israel until 2000. "For the first time we have a clear document according to which the economy can be planned in accordance with the requirements and the possibilities," said Director-General of the Ministry of Energy David Hago'el who coordinated the teams involved in the analysis of the policy.

Adverse Effect on the Balance of Payments

The State of Israel lacks primary sources of energy, and it now imports almost all of its energy requirements. About 98 percent of the consumption comes from imports. In spite of the fact that there are other oil importing countries, in none of the industrialized countries is the dependence on oil so complete.

Although Japan, for example, imports over 99 percent of its oil requirements, it has additional sources of energy, and so it actually imports only 75 percent of the energy which it consumes. Similarly, Denmark also imports 85 percent, Ireland 75 percent, and Greece 73 percent.

This extreme dependence of Israel on the importation of oil causes much more damage to the State of Israel in political, security, and economic terms.

The economic growth of the State of Israel is in danger because of the increase in the economic burden as a result of the import and supply of energy. Since the Iranian crisis in 1979, the State of Israel's expenditures for the importation of oil have almost doubled, from \$1.3 billion in 1979 to \$2.1 billion in 1980.

In no country in the western world have the expenditures for the importation of oil reached such a rate.

The increase in the expenditure of foreign currency for the importation of oil because of the worsening of business conditions has reached 5 percent (\$900 million) of the gross national product in contrast to an increase of 3.9 percent which was paid during the previous oil crisis in 1974 (\$410 million), according to a report of the Bank of Israel in 1980.

It is clear from this that if these conditions continue, and certainly if they worsen, the State of Israel will find it difficult to guarantee a reasonable annual growth rate which is vital to the economy, and the business conditions and the balance of payments will worsen in the future. In such conditions the Israeli economy must turn to other channels of supply and increase the efficiency of its use of energy.

Because of political compulsions, Israel is forced to depend upon contractual purchases from only two countries, which only amount to 60 percent of its consumption. This supply depends upon friendship or "political understandings" and not on bilateral interests. Israel is forced to obtain the remainder in the free market—the market of opportunities—the "spot market." The fact that in this market in recent years higher prices have been paid than in the contractual markets causes much more damage to Israel in terms of its capabilities of purchasing oil in a planned and systematic manner and in the quantity and quality appropriate for Israeli consumption. This is the reason for the importance of the tendency to call for the varying of the energy sources imported into Israel.

The Era of Coal in Industry

The virtually exclusive energy source of Israel today is the imported liquid fuel. In order to significantly reduce the State's dependence on imported liquid fuel, the Ministry of Energy is endeavoring to divert the use to the following additional kinds of fuel:

--Coal: The ministry's policy is based on the principle that in the coming decade coal will be the significant primary substitute for liquid fuel. 1981 is actually the year for the entry of the electric economy into the era of coal with the operation of the first unit of the power plant in Hadera by coal. In 1-2 years industry will also enter the era of coal with the conversion of the first cement factory to the use of coal.

Toward the end of this decade, according to the plans for development and conversion initiated by the Ministry of Energy, coal will represent 75-80 percent of the fuel input for the generation of electricity in the country or about 35-40 percent of all the energy inputs to the economy.

--Nuclear: The Ministry of Energy is examining the various possibilities for the construction of nuclear power plants for the generation of electricity in preparation for their actual operation in the next decade.

The preparation of a manpower basis and know-how by the use of existing structures such as the Electric Company and the Atomic Energy Commission and by the creation of joint or new structures.

The preparation of physical conditions for the introduction of power reactors by preparing locations for power reactors including the finding of solutions for suitable means of cooling and the study of the damage caused by unprotected power reactors and their effect on the population.

The preparation of a nuclear fuel basis—the extraction of uranium from phosphates, the production of fuel rods, and the guarantee of assured sources of supply for nuclear fuel.

The installation of the reactors within the framework of electricity generating systems will be based on the purchase or copying of existing plans with the hope for maximum involvement of Israeli planning in the production of components and systems.

--Solar Energy: Israel leads the world in the number of solar energy systems for the heating of water. The use of solar systems for the heating of water is likely to reach 2 percent of the total energy consumption in Israel (today it already constitutes 1.3 percent).

Solar pools, an original Israeli development likely to constitute an "energy break-through." To date a test facility has been successfully operated in 'En Boqeq. A plan has been worked out for accelerated development which includes the construction of a solar pool over an area of 250 dunams which will operate a five-megawatt turbine in 1983. If the development process is successful, it can be regarded as having the potential for supplying a significant part of the electricity requirement in Israel.

--Shale oil: With the recent discoveries of layers of shale in the southern Negev, known quantities of shale in Israel amounts to about 4 billion tons. The ministry estimates that this source can yield 20-30,000 barrels of oil a day.

--Hydroelectric energy: The "Seas Canal Project" is intended to exploit the height difference of 400 meters between the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea, and it is likely to be integrated into the system for supplying electricity with a capacity of 600-800 megawatts for generating electricity.

--Geothermal energy: The Ministry of Energy included within the framework of the desalination project the drilling of test holes for the exploitation of geothermal energy sources which have been discovered in the Ashdod region. In this project the possibilities of exploiting the energy in the industrial enterprises in the region and in the desalination facility in Ashdod will be examined.

--Bio-gas: In the kibbutz of Kfar Giladi a project for the exploitation of agricultural waste, which produces 600 cubic meters of bio-gas a day, has already been applied. A part of the kibbutz's energy consumption is provided in the form of methane gas which is produced from the fermentation of animal waste. The Ministry of Energy hopes to bring the project to the commercial stage in order to disseminate it among the agricultural settlements in the country for self-supply of their energy needs.

--Wind energy: At this stage, the first tests are being conducted for the production of electricity from wind energy for local use by integrating it into the overall system. Concurrently, two pioneering facilities will be constructed in selected regions for local use.

5830

CSO: 4232/25

ISRAEL

SINAI BEDOUINS COMPLAIN OF RETURN TO EGYPTIAN RULE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Jul 81 Weekend Supplement pp 22-23

Article by Ya'aqov Havaquq: "Voice in the Wilderness; 'You Took Us Up to Heaven and Now You Are Casting Us Down,' Says a Young Bedouin in the Sinai After Having Tasted Life and Sin; Soon He and His Tribe Will Live Under Egyptian Rule; News From Egyptian Side Not Encouraging"7

Text? There is a somber mood in the Sinai these days, especially in the narrow eastern strip which is still under Israeli rule. The hopes and dreams which were nurtured for years have been smashed. The eventuality all the desert residents, both Israelis and Bedouins, have feared, became a reality. While the Israelis are arguing with the authorities about reperations, their Bedouin neighbors are doing some soul searching. No one visits them, no institution deals with them. The desert was and remains their home despite; the change of rule.

On the eve of the total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the Bedouins of south Sinai are looking back fondly upon the past, especially the recent past. Those who lived under Egyptian rule until 1967 know at least what is in store for them. The younger ones are gathering every bit of information to be prepared for the advent of the new-old regime. The Bedouins understand that the fat years are over, and the lean years are about to start. As children of the desert, unpampered by their environment, they must have attributes which will help them live under the new reality.

A deep change has taken place in the behavior of the 3500 Bedouins who have remained in the south of Sinai. Their openness is gone, replaced by long moments of silence. Their eyes are sad. They look betrayed, no longer showing that twinkle in their eyes of years past. On the eve of the total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai the Bedouins are especially careful in their dealings with the Israelis in general and with the military government in particular. They know that the Egyptian Big Brother is listening. They are afraid the eyes of the next ruler are watching and they are not taking any risks. Each Bedouin prepares his own alibi and makes sure he does not give the Egyptians any food for thought. When the men gather at night around the glowing coals to sip coffee, they analyze every shred of information from across the border. Every official statement issued by Egypt is analyzed ad infinitum. In their gatherings the Bedouins prefer to be alone with their problems. Israeli strangers, including those whom they welcomed in the past, are no longer welcomed. Their Bedouin tradition does not allow them to say so openly, but their cool attitude leaves no room for doubt.

Atawi Mahmud Sulayman of the 'Awalma branch of the Hamzayinah tribe, a tall lean man, symbolizes these days the realistic Bedouin type, who accepts the present as a divine decree and cautiously keeps a watchful eye on the place where the new masters of the desert are stationed. His 38-year experience of living in the Sinai doing various jobs shows clearly. He is bright and cunning and knows what is going on. In the presence of local guests he is doubly cautious. He chooses his words carefully, making sure not to say anything unwarranted. His statements are phrased in such a manner that he always leaves himself a way out. In private conversation when his words are not recorded he feels more at ease and his words are more blunt.

Atawi has two wives. One is about to give birth. She stayed in his house in Wadi Sa'al, not far from the Egyptian-Israeli border check post. The second, in whose house he is staying tonight in Nuwayba al-Mazayinah, is younger, and is also pregnant. This wife is busy preparing a drink for the guests who are sitting outside, under the acacia. When the tea is ready she puts down the blue kettle and disappears inside her house, according to the Bedouin custom, Her husband, the host, gets up and brings the kettle and the cups and serves his guests. While pouring he studies the blank faces of his guests, trying to find out what is going on inside their heads. He knows that they would like to loosen their tongues and release some of their tension and bitterness, but are afraid.

Atawi argues in front of his guests that there is no point for the Bedouins to harbor any illusions, they have to be honest and realistic. They have to accept the situation as it is, without embellishments. "Recent developments bother us considerably. No one took the time to tell us what has happened or what is going to happen. We are fed rumors and ambiguous statements." He says frankly: "We had it good when Israel was in charge here. We received better education than ever before. We had excellent health care. More than one was a sick person or a woman about to give birth picked up by a helicopter. We were shown that everyone, even a Bedouin in a remote wadi, is a human being. As for the Egyptians, in the areas which were returned to them, we haven't heard of anyone picked up by their helicopters. Nor do they have a doctor, like the Israelis. We get news from those areas. We know that it is difficult to find work there, which of course does not make us feel too happy. There is severe rationing of basic food items over there. Can we feel happy about those things? We all have relatives there and when you know your relatives are having work and food problems what are you supposed to do? How do you feel? Actually our hands are tied. There is not much we can do for them. We can only pray to Allah. Who can we trust if not Him?"

Silk Soft Hands

The men sitting around nod in agreement. He is the only one who dares to speak openly. The others only speak behind a mask of anonymity. One man, pot bellied, with a thick dark mustache and blue painted dark eyes, becomes bold and says: "We know very well what happens on the other side. To put it mildly, our brethren over there live under difficult conditions. Anyone who does not have a car does not find work. Nearly all the vendors in the territories which have been returned have been investigated. Those who had property or stalls until 1967 were allowed to go on selling; those who made their property during the Israeli rule were suspected of collaborating. No need to say too much about the fate of the collaborators. Someone mentioned the rationing of basic food items. Did you know that if they find a bag of sugar or rice in a Bedouin's house they investigate him, confiscate the bag and punish him? A few days ago someone came here from the Egyptian side and told us some very interesting stories."

The last sentence spoken by the unidentified speaker jolts nearly all those present. He might have said more than he should. Someone makes a vague remark to the effect that the person in question stayed at the house of the local shaykh. The latter, 'Abdallah Rabi' Darwish, who until now was half asleep, wakes up. "No, I heard someone came but I did not see him. He asked my wife about my whereabouts, and she told him I was not home and he went away."

After he finished his short personal apology he appeared relieved. He started sprucing himself up, straightening his rumpled robe, crossing his legs under himself and adding emphatically: "The men spoke about the situation as they see it. Let me tell you what I think. Until the 1967 War we were in the desert like our fathers and grandfathers. We did not see a car, we did not see an airplane, we were not picked up by a helicopter, but we managed to live. When we heard a war broke out we prayed to Allah as is our custom, and we said, Allah, make sure it all works out for the best! We did not say no to Egypt and no to Israel, rather we said, Allah, make sure it all works out for the best! Now too we turn to Allah and we say, Master of the World, make sure it all works out for the best!"

The diplomatic approach of 'Abdallah Rabi', the armless, bitter shaykh who leads the Hamzayinah tribe which dwells in Nuwayba, whose genteel words do not find any fault with the Egyptian rule, make those present shake their heads in derision. They realize, as we do, that his delicate position makes him say those things. A little later, in a private conversation, one of the Bedouins tells about the humiliating attitude of the Egyptians. A few weeks ago a group of Bedouins from the Israeli side wanted to pay a condolence visit to Shaykh 'Awda Salah Mubarakh, who lives in Wadi Fayran after he lost his father. The military government let them go through, but at the Egyptian check point near Shaykh Faranjah (not far from the St Catherine airfield) the Egyptians stopped the group and would not let it go through. "We told the Egyptians," he recalls, "the Jews let us through without any problems, while you who are Muslims like us won't let us go to Fayran to console the shaykh. The Egyptian officer was adamant. He told us haughtily to go back."

Since that disappointed group came back the story has been making the rounds of the Sinai among thousands of Bedouins along the eastern shore. This incident too leads the Bedouins to the same conclusion: One should be prepared for hard times under the Egyptian military rule. This preparation does not only mean less contact with the Israeli military government or caution with strangers. It also means quick stockpiling. The Bedouins are busy buying cars and trucks so they can make a living in the future. Those who lost their jobs, such as the ones who worked for the military or civilian government, are looking for other employment. Anyone who works saves his money. Atawi, like his friends, does not save Israeli money. Once or twice a week he travels to Elat or to the Gaza Strip and exchanged Israeli money for Egyptian pounds or dollars. Besides the cash he keeps in his coat pocket, he also carries a small calculator. "Last week," he recounts, "I went to exchange more than 200,000 Israeli pounds, mine and my friends," and without the calculator I would have gotten confused."

Bir Sal. A Bedouin concentration near the Israel-Egypt border check point. Dozens of shacks scattered about, some practically on the border. No men are seen early in the morning. Most of them must be working in Elat, in N'viot, or elsewhere.

Also the mag'ad, the gathering place of the men and the place of hospitality, is empty. We park the jeep near the stone built maq'ad, in order to prepare breakfast. LtCol Ran Peri, Governor of South Sinai, opens a can; another official unloads the jerrycan and the vegetable box. While we are opening the cans two Bedouin boys approach us. Their heads are shaven, except for a strip of hair in the middle of their head. They salute us like grownups, and without further ado turn to their work. One takes a rock and starts splitting a piece of wood. His friend collects kindling wood and paper. They start a fire in the mag'ad, and put on the kettle, which was kept in a concavity in the wall. A third boy, who came to see who the guests are, turns around and runs back in an unknown direction. The boy in the lined robe, who has split the wood, sees the fire subside. He takes some kindling wood and begins to revive the fire. Meanwhile the third boy returns with two adult men. One chubby man, wearing a dusty white robe, shakes our hands, and takes the place of the boy who made the fire. The latter starts rinsing the cups in the mag'ad. The adult takes an old tin can out of the concavity in the wall and puts it next to us. The governor hands him tea bags and sugar. The Bedouin at first refuses to take the offering. Only after several repeated offers does he accept. He pours the sugar out of the plastic bag into the kettle and adds a handful of sugar from the tin can. The tea bags he discards disdainfully, and prefers to throw in tea leaves from another tin can. When he notices our looks of surprise he waves the tea bags in our faces and says with an ironic wink, "This (the tea bags the governor gave him) is Jewish tea..."

While the man is preparing the tea the rest of the men who are around come over to the mag'ad. When the governor asks one of the men why so many men are around, he tells him: "Your honor, a Bedouin likes to work I week and then rest for 2 months." No one laughs. They all appear to agree with him. Some 50 years ago Maj C.S. Jarvis, who was the Governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936, became aware of this Bedouin trait. He described the Bedouins as parasites and hopeless bums. In one of his books, Jarvis writes: "The Bedouin is not a worker. He hates all menial labor. He considers it beneath a man's honor to dirty his hands with a spade or hoe. This becomes evident when one shakes the hand of one of the members of this noble race. Instead of shaking a rough hand, as can be expected of a someone who grew up in the desert, one touches a hand soft as silk."

The Price of Peace

Not far from the maq'ad is the border linking El Arish with Ras Muhammad. Until the final Israeli withdrawal in April 1982, this is the border. Except for some barriers along the border line, the border is open. This fact, it turns out, attracts the Bedouins. Tire tracks in the sand, off the main highway, reveal the activity on both sides of the border. In recent months the military government officials, who are in charge of security in the area, have caught several smugglers. The confiscated merchandise showed that the Bedouins on the Egyptian side need sugar, rice, tea, flour. From the Egyptian side they tried to smuggle fuel, clothes, shoes, cigarettes, and electronic products. The smuggling is not purely commercial. The Bedouin lives in the desert, under difficult conditions, and is raised on the principle of tribal solidarity. This solidarity is his socio-economic support in time of need. This desert principle does not recognize any international borders, permanent or temporary. Now too, the borderline between Israel and Egypt which divides tribes and families does not change this Bedouin principle. When a Bedouin on one side of the border hears that members of his family on the other side lack food he will do everything

within his powers to help them, even break the law. But there is no guarantee that this traditional custom may not be used to smuggle weapons or to engage in intelligence activities. In this regard neither the Bedouins nor the military government are, understandably, too keen.

The teacher Maslim Salim Maslim of the Tarabin tribe, a corpulent man, caresses the wounds inflicted on him by the Bedouin burn expert. The teacher, a resident of Nuwayba a-Tarbin, suffered lately from back aches and became bad-ridden. He went to see the doctor and was prescribed pills. He took the pills but nothing happened. He went to Jum'a, the food vendor next to the fort in Nuwayba a-Tarbin. The vendor told him to lie on his stomach and put an iron rod in the fire. He applied the rod to the patient's back until it resembled a chess board. Since then Maslim has felt well. The back aches disappeared, but the burns have not healed yet. He sits for hours on end in his yard, caresses his wounds and smokes. The sand next to his feet is strewn with cigarette butts.

The teacher keeps fidgeting. It is not clear whether his discomfort is due to pain or to being exposed to his guest, who happens to be a journalist. One of his neighbors comes to his aid. A tall man with stubble on his cheeks, forlorn clothes, and coarse bare feet. He says things which we have heard already in Bir Sal and Nuwayba al-Muzayinah, but as he goes on he becomes more interesting. "The Egyptian period was a dark age for us. Israel brought us up to the modern period, opened our eyes, and as we began to understand what was going on around us, we are back where we started. It's strange, we have always been ruled by military authorities, Turks, British, Egyptian, and now you. Yet, with the exception of Israel, all the rulers treated us with contempt. The Egyptians, for example, never treated us as human beings. They accorded us the kind of treatment they thought we deserved, the way they saw us. Few of us could read and write, so we were considered ignorant. The Egyptians treated us like boors. True, we are not experts on politics or the ways of the modern world. We live in the desert. Give us water, give us bread, give us pasture, and you won't find anyone happier than us. We are not concerned with educating our children, with reading and writing, or that distant future."

Similar words were written by Maj Jarvis, the British governor, more than 50 years ago. "The Sinai Bedouins are ignorant, but that does not mean they have no brains. I have always maintained that the average Bedouin is born with a very good mind. But it deteriorates for lack of use." Our interlocutor seems to read our thoughts and continues: "Our relations with the Egyptians," he explains, were complex and delicate. Since we were of no value to them, they did not bother to elevate us. They probably preferred to keep us ignorant. I think their negative attitude toward us stemmed from racial reasons. They saw themselves as descendants of the Pharachs, sons of an ancient glorious culture, while we were backward people. Let me give you a good illustration. A Bedouin youth of the Daladla (a branch of the Tarbin tribe which lives in Jabal Ma'ara) went to Egypt in 1948 to study engineering. He then went to do graduate study in Germany. Since 1953 the Egyptians have prevented him from going back to his family in the Sinai. They were afraid he might put ideas in our heads."

He pauses, and then concludes: "The Egyptians saw us as uneducated and unimportant people, and the experience we have had with them in recent months shows that they have not changed their view of us."

Maslim Salim Maslim seems to enjoy the task of pouring. Instead of having to reveal his feelings on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal he lets his neighbor speak. Maslim does not stop his neighbor. He encourages him to talk by pouring him cup after cup. The neighbor is excited, he rolls a cigarette, fills his lungs with smoke and puffs leisurely. Moments later he continues in a low voice, as if sharing a secret: "A few years ago there was a wise Bedouin, who has since died, who came up with an interesting idea. He proposed sending a delegation of Bedouin dignitaries to Amman, who would meet with the British consul general, and would urge him to ask his government to separate the Sinai from Egypt and grant it autonomy."

The man died and the idea died with him. Even now there are not too many takers for this idea, perhaps because the Bedouins realize it is not feasible. The old Bedouins who still remember the British rule, know that the problem no longer concerns the British. One of them, who must have been brought up to date on the geopolitical changes since World War II, has seriously suggested organizing the delegation, but instead of sending it to the British consul general in Amman, he suggested that they go to see the American ambassador in the capital city of the Hashemite Kingdom.

The Bedouins in the Sinai feel betrayed. A young Bedouin who has "tasted of life and of sin" in recent years has put their feelings well: "You took us up to heaven and now you are throwing us away, just like that. When someone is blind he learns to live with his handicap. When you open his eyes he realizes what he missed when he was blind. When you cover his eyes again it will be hard for him to get used to it. The same is true with us. The Jews who have recently settled in the Sinai are receiving reparations, are told what is going on. No one cares about us, no one explains anything. Others negotiate and no one asks us. We pay the price of peace."

9565

CSO: 4323/38

GUSH EMUNIM PLANS SINAI EVACUATION PROTEST

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Jeffrey Heller]

[Text]

YAMIT. — Gush Emunim leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger will soon focus his activities on preventing the evacuation of settlements in Sinai, a close confidant said yesterday.

Rabbi Yosef Anteman, a veteran of Gush Emunim settlement attempts in Judea and Samaria, said that Levinger's exact plans cannot yet be disclosed. But he said the Kiryat Arba rabbi will definitely not be moving into Yamit, or try to set up new settlements in Sinai.

Anteman, together with his wife and five children, are among the 13 religious families who last month moved into Housing Ministryowned flats in Yamit.

They may soon be followed by Tehiya MK Hanan Porat, he said.

The newcomers, Anteman said, will not resort to violence to prevent the pull-back, scheduled for April 1982. Levinger, he said, "is not violent, but calculating." Anteman added, "There are people in the region, however, who will take exceptional action."

A veteran Yamit resident, who identified himself only as Shlomo, said that the 13 families "want to

put us in the category of extremists so that the government will have an excuse to evacuate us by force."

If violence erupts during the pullback, he said, the Neot Sinai vegetable garden incident "will look like a joke."

The mood in Yamit is one of bitterness against a government that, as residents wryly note, has not even sent out letters officially informing them they will have to leave next April.

"They want to wear us down, so that we'll drop to our knees and beg for money," Shlomo said.

Business owners yesterday did receive letters from the government giving them until the end of the month to send in assessments for compensation, and advertisements tacked on the town centre's bulletin boards offer flats for sale in Beersheba, Kiryat Bialik, Ra'anana and elsewhere in Israel.

Anteman said that the flats which the 13 families obtained recently were arranged for legally with the Housing Ministry, but he declined to give any details. He said that the flats had never been occupied before.

The flats are situated next to an eerie-looking section of Yamit, in which completed air-raid shelters stand in sand dunes upon which houses will never be erected.

The families, most of whom left homes in Judea and Samaria they can presumably return to after April 1982, have found employment in Yamit and will send their children to the religious school in the city.

A belief that Yamit is situated inside the biblical Land of Israel was the underlying reason for setting up house there.

Anteman quoted Numbers 34:VI, in which Nahal Mitzraim — the Egyptian river — is listed as the Land of Israel's southern border. The river, he said, could be interpreted as meaning Wadi el-Arish, south of Yamit.

The move, at a time when most Yamit residents are thinking about compensation terms and starting anew elsewhere, was also meant to boost morale.

"Our coming here caused great waves of support in the region," Anteman said. "Everyone should know that the people who built this town won't give up easily."

CSO: 4300/92

SABBATH BAN THREATENS OIL EXPLORATION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Aryeh Wolman]

[Text]

The coalition agreement proposing to ban oil drillings on the Sabbath will end oil exploration in Israel, senior engineers and managers in the industry told The Jerusalem Post yesterday.

A weekly interruption of the drillings — in which more than \$30 million a year is invested — will cause the bore holes to collapse and play havoc with the methods of detecting the presence of oil, they claimed. Weekend breaks are not accepted by any oil-drilling firm in the world and their introduction in Israel would deter all further private investment, they added.

Physics Professor Ze'ev Lev, a member of the three-man committee which grants work permits for the Sabbath, claimed, however, that the technological means are available to prevent the collapse of the drilling holes. He argued further that the Sabbath work-force could be cut by at least 20 to 30 per cent, by introducing the technology and organizational methods already used in Japan and West Germany. These allow production lines and maintenance work to be stopped entirely at weekends.

Lev said that the walls of drilling holes are normally prevented from collapsing by circulating a fluid at high pressure inside the holes. But it is possible to cycle the fluid automatically in a closed system on a rest day, he said.

Because of this possibility, the committee does not permit Mekorot to drill for water on the Sabbath, said Lev, a member of the National Religious Party. U.S. firms have successfully used the technology in oil drillings, mainly in cases of emergency, he claimed.

But engineers in the government Oil Exploration Investment company said that such a system, even if workable in an emergency, is costly and risky. Furthermore, ceasing work on the Subbuth would damage rock formations, which in turn would affect the pressure of any oil catchments and make them difficult or impossible to detect, they said.

"All our contracts with investors stipulate that we must operate according to standard drilling procedures," one engineer said. "If we now have to change those procedures, all our private-finance will be withdrawn. No investor is going to take on an additional unknown risk because of horse-trading with the religious parties."

Lev suid that factories in operation abroad are designed to allow the entire production line to be shut down at weekends. Also, sub-units could be shut down temporarily and by-passed during the week to allow maintenance work to be carried out then rather than on Saturday or Sunday. He gives as examples the car and glass industries.

"About 50 per cent of all the workers on the Sabbath do maintenance work," he said. "This figure could be cut by half or more."

Israel Meidan, director of the government's Productivity Institute, said that in theory Lev is correct. "But you can't bring about a managerial and technological revolution overnight because of a coalition agreement," he said. "Attitudes change slowly, and replacing old machinery takes even longer."

A similar view was voiced yesterday by Yossi Shalit, managingdirector of the government-owned Negev Phosphates, which is also subject to pressure to cut its Sabbath work-force by the coalition agreement. Shalit said that fewer than 100 of the 1,700 work-force are employed on the Sabbath. Their main job is to keep the furnaces hot.

"It would be possible to replace nearly all of them by robots," he said. "But the investment required is too great to be justified on economic grounds. If the government is prepared to pay the price, however, then I'll go along with it."

cso: 4300/92

TAX REVENUES SURPASS PROJECTIONS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Aug 81 p 7

[Article by Slomo Maoz]

[Text]

Government tax revenue grew in real terms by 11 per cent in the first third of the current fiscal year as compared with the same period iast year, despite the newly introduced tax cuts. Had taxes not been cut by Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, this revenue would have increased by 16 per cent.

In the past four months, government revenue from taxes reached IS24 billion, IS6.7b. of which was collected during July.

In nominal terms, tax revenue in the first third of this year grew by 146.6 per cent as compared with the same period last year. The major revenue increase stemmed from taxes on imports, which rose in nominal terms during the period by 222 per cent to reach IS3.2b.

Value added tax on locally produced goods accounted for nearly IS5b., representing a nominal ncrease of 190 per cent.

Income tax, amounting to some IS13.5 billion, "increased by a nominal 129 per cent as compared with the same period last year.

State Revenue Administration director Uriel Linn told The Jerusalem Post yesterday that despite the tax officials' sanctions at the end of last month, the authorities in July collected more money than had been projected. He believes that tax collection will surpass projections for the entire year.

Linn estimates that government losses fron tax cuts will this year reach IS2.6 billion.

Linn said that while revenue from taxes on imports had stabilized, revenue from income tax was on the increase. He attributed this success to the innovations introduced by the authorities during the past two years, including increased fines on late tax payments.

In another area, government tax officials are scheduled to meet today to discuss whether they will go on strike in the coming days in pursuit of their pay claims.

CSO: 4300/92

CANAL THREATENS LOSSES FOR DEAD SEA WORKS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Macabee Dean]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — The Mediterranean-Dead Sea hydro-electric canal will cause the Dead Sea Works damages of about \$100m. To offset this future incursion on profits, the company's board of directors has decided to earmark IS75m. this year, and a similar sum every year until the canal is completed in about a decade.

This was stated yesterday by Arie Shahar, general manager of the Dead Sea Works, who added that the undertaking had a "very good year." both in production and in profits, in 1980-81. "If every industrial enterprise in the country could reach the level of success we have, we would be well ahead on the road to economic independence," he said.

The figure of \$100m. for damages is only an estimate, he said, noting that it had been made by a Knesset committee about a year ago. The damages would be due to the fact that the mineral concentration of the Dead Sea would be diluted by the incoming sea water. Retaining dy kes would have to be strengthened and their height increased, and there would also be less evaporation, slowing down the production process.

The Dead Sea Works yesterday decided to set up a special commit-

tee to study the effects of these and other possible causes of damage.

Shahar noted that although \$100m. seemed a large sum, it would only constitute one year's net profits of the Dead Sea Works, if these profits continued at their present rate. However, the \$100m. would also have to be considered as part of the cost of building the canal, he said.

In 1980-81 the Dead Sea Works produced 1,344,000 tons of potash, "and this is 12 per cent, or 144,000 tons above the rated capacity of the plant," he said. He noted that "every ton over the rated capacity contributed greatly to the profits."

The high production was due to "intensive efforts to keep machinery in top shape, the presence of sufficient raw materials from the evaporation ponds, and especially outstanding efforts by the entire staff," Shahar said. Productivity rose by 3.5 per cent last year.

"We are giving our 1,300 workers a IS12.5m. bonus on account of 1980-81." In the previous year the bonus was only IS4.5m.

Exports dropped by 3.4 per cent, to 1,333,090 tons, in 1980-81, but the slight drop (due to bad economic conditions abroad) was offset by a 38 per cent increase in the price the potash fetched. Part of the increase in puyments is due to the company's

policy of cutting shipments to those places which pay in a weakening currency and stepping up deliveries to places where the currency is strengthening.

On the other hand, the company lost some of its profits (or potential profits) since income in foreign currency lagged 25 per cent behind the costs of production (based on the index).

However, the "bottom line"—
net profits after all expenses and
taxes, stood at IS589m., out of a
total income of IS1,116m., Shahar
said. The Dead Sea Works had two
main sources of income: its operations, 1S358m., plus another
IS349m. from its investments (most
of these are index-linked bonds,
etc., which rose in price without rising in real value).

After taxes the net profit, as noted, was IS589m. This is a 59 per cent "real" (or 279 per cent unadjusted) increase over the profits of 1979-80, Shahar said. He believes that about a quarter of all the profits are inflationary, and not real. Just the same, he considers the results satisfactory.

The board has decided to pay a final cash dividend of 20 per cent in addition to the 25 per cent already paid (40 per cent last year), plus a 65 per cent bonus share dividend (125 per cent last year).

CSO: 4300/92

CONSTRUCTION ELEMENTS HIT SINAI CONTRACT METHODS

TA171416 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by economic affairs correspondent El'azar Levin]

[Text] The U.S. Corps of Engineers last week published a tender for the construction of two camps for the multinational policing force in Sinai. Clearly, the tender was "fixed" so that the U.S. firms would win it, and it was set up so that Israeli contractors would be unable to take part in it. This, despite the fact that, formally, a copy of the tender was sent to the Israeli Defense Ministry for it to invite Israeli firms to take part in it.

The tender, which is for the construction of camps and installations for the international force at Etam and Ofira, is estimated to be worth about \$100 million. Published in the United States and in Israel last Thursday [13 August], the tender asserted that any contractor wishing to take part in it must appear the following Monday [17 August] in the offices of the Corps of Engineers in Alabama in order to submit his offers. Obviously, this proviso prevented any Israeli firm from taking part in the tender.

The publication of the fixed tender aroused considerable anger among construction elements in Israel, since the building will take place in an area that will be under Israeli sovereignty until April 1982, by which date the construction work itself is supposed to be completed. Israeli elements expressed criticism of the Defense Ministry in this affair, saying that it was a repeat of the affair of the construction of the Negev airfields by U.S. firms. In reaction, Defense Ministry sources said that since the U.S. Government was financing 60 percent of the investments in the camps, it could not be asked to have Israeli firms do the work.

Sources in the construction industry say that having U.S. firms build the airfields had turned out to be a dismal failure. The construction itself was costing \$1 billion, whereas Israeli firms had at the time estimated that they could get the job done for \$600 million at the outside. It was now emerging that the U.S. firms were behind schedule in the construction of the runways, the installations and the buildings. This was originally reported by HA'ARETZ on 30 July and it was confirmed yesterday by a senior IDF officer in an interview in the LOS ANGELES TIMES.

The heads of the coordinating institution in the construction industry--Solel Bone Director-General Shraga Rotman and the chairman of the Association for the Promotion

of Contractors, Avraham Goldstein--yesterday sent cables to the prime minister, the defense minister and the finance minister, protesting the fact that U.S. firms were getting the work and warning against a repeat of the Negev airfields affairs.

This reporter has learned that the contractors intend to demand firmly that if the U.S. tender cannot be annulled, the Defense Ministry must at least insist that the sub-contracting work be given to Israeli firms. Construction industry sources are apprehensive that the Corps of Engineers intends to have Egyptian firms do the sub-contracting work at both places as part of the political and economic tightening of relations between the United States and Egypt. These sources note that the Israeli firms have considerable international experience in the construction of all types of camps and installations and that it would be very strange if construction work in an area presently under Israeli sovereignty should go to Egyptian companies.

CSO: 4323/42

HA'ARETZ ASSESSES SHARON'S W. BANK POLICY

TA141227 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] What is new in Ari'el Sharon's remarks to the inhabitants of the territories?

It seems to me that the most essential point is the announcement that from now on the inhabitants of the territories and their leaders have a clearer address and that the meetings and talks with Palestinian notables in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be renewed.

Sharon wanted to say that from now on the responsibility for implementing the government's policy in the territories is transferred from the chief of staff to the new defense minister and that the vacuum existing on this issue on the political level has been filled. The new minister will speak with the leaders in the territories and will hear their opinions directly. It was not stated whether the talks will touch on political issues also and not on municipal affairs only. This is a novelty but only a prelude still.

What cannot be found in Ari'el Sharon's message to the residents of the territories? Sharon did not say a word about the government's previous decision according to which the leaders in the territories must not meet with PLO representatives abroad and must not make declarations of support for the PLO and its objectives, nor are PLO funds allowed into the territories. Hence, these instructions have remained unchanged. The talks Sharon will conduct will be with individual mayors and not with the National Guidance Committee it was decided to liquidate due to its representation of the PLO. The question then is whether Sharon's interlocutors will dare say more in their talks with him than with Moshe Dayan in the past, for example.

Minister Sharon's remarks indicate his readiness to change the atmosphere and this should not be belittled. This is important even if it is not intended to change the main tendencies of Israel in the territories. At stake is chiefly a change of atmosphere toward the population but not toward those leaders who overtly support the PLO or the rejectionist front's organizations.

As for the attitude of the IDF and the military government toward the population Sharon promised they will exercise respect and refrain from humiliating actions.

It should be remembered that such instructions have always existed but mishaps and humiliation did recur just as one finds harrassment in the IDF despite the prohibitions. Those standing at the roadblocks are not military government personnel but IDF soldiers and mainly reservists. The entry into schools which are not extraterritorial premises was forbidden in the past as well and an entrance permit is given in special cases only by the coordinator of activities in the territories. Senior commanders were even removed in the past due to irregularities on this issue. The problem facing the commanders was how to behave when students hurl stones from within their schoolyards at passing cars or hoist Falastin flags inside their schools. Collective punishments stopped a long time ago, except for curfews. The demolition of a house is a collective punishment also since this affects the family members of the accused as well but this punishment is still valid. However, if the intention is to put an end to harrassment during identification parades then the change is important.

For the time being there are no new regulations regarding conduct in the territories. In the first meeting of the defense minister with the executors of the policy in the territories—prior to the news conference [12 August]—such instructions were not given. Only time will prove whether the change in atmosphere will lead to a change in policy as well or whether this is mere fireworks.

CSO: 4323/42

BRIEFS

JULY UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS—The number of job seekers declined in June and about 32,500 people were registered in the employment service offices, about 2,500 less than in May. The number of unemployed also dropped in June to about 1,000 people. In the first quarter of this year, the number of workers from the territories employed in Israel grew by 10 percent. Most of them come from the Gaza Strip. On a weekly average, nearly 78,000 are employed in Israel. This emerges from a family survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [Text] [TAO41451 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 4 Aug 81]

ARAB PROTEST LEAFLET--Chairman of the Students' Association in Israel Tzahi Hanegbi claims that the Arab students' committee distributed a leaflet today in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem campuses, saying, inter alia, that those students would fight for recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Arab Palestinian people. Hanagbi sent the leaflet to the minister of defense and called upon the minister to state that the new policy in the territories does not include permission for incitement in campuses. According to him, since the law to prevent terror was enacted about 1 year ago, no such leaflets have been distributed. [Text] [TA141359 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 14 Aug 81]

ANTI-ISRAELI SLOGANS, SONGS--Anti-Israeli slogans were drawn on Monday [17 August] on the car of the Golan Heights military governor. One of the slogans was "Syria--al-Ba'th," according to Druze residents on the Golan. The security forces have launched an investigation. In recent weeks, weddings in Druze settlements on the Golan have become focal points for incitement against Israel. It has been learned that during festivities that took place in the past few days the participants sang songs against the state of Israel and in favor of Syrian rule on the Golan. Meetings are also reported to have been held between Golan residents and Arabs from Judaea and Samaria, who are inciting the Golan Druze to act against Israel and against those Druze known for their identification with Israel. In the meantime, the security forces are continuing their comprehensive investigation to discover who raised a Syrian flag at the end of last week in the village of Majdal Shams, and who broke into the local school. [Excerpt] [TA191057 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 81 p 2]

CSO: 4323/42

IMPORTANCE OF NATION'S ANIMAL RESOURCES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] Authorities in the Ministry of Public Works have prepared a report about animal resources in Kuwait that considers animal production one of the complementary branches of agricultural production. It considers it one of the staples providing people with food security, especially the animal protein that is supplied equally by red meat, poultry, eggs, or milk. The report said that people in Kuwait get most of their daily requirements from meat and animal protein since the individual's share of daily protein amounts to almost 33 grams, about half of which is from chicken and mutton. Furthermore, statistics show that local production provides about 12 percent of the total yearly consumption of animal products in Kuwait. Local production of mutton covers only 7.7 percent of local consumption (perhaps this may amount to 10 percent when sheep slaughtered in the home during holidays are included). The local production of beef covers only 6 percent, and milk and milk products amounts to only 5.8 percent of total consumption, while poultry is 31.7 percent and eggs cover 44.4 percent. It is clear from this report that it is necessary to develop local animal production on a level which can provide society with food security, particularly after the food-producing countries' threat to employ foodstuffs as a political and economic weapon. It recommends that a list of concerns be achieved, notably: 1) Establishing the aims of agriculture in general in Kuwait, and founding large companies for animal production. 2) Giving material and moral support to breeders of cattle, sheep, and poultry. 3) Training Kuwaiti youth for work in agricultural and animal husbandry fields. 4) Setting up a research center specially for animal production and poultry slaughterhouses. 5) Subsidize local poultry industry: Imported poultry gets two kinds of support, one from the producing country and one from the importing country Whilst the local industry does not receive any kind of support.

9587

CSO: 4304/85

BRIEFS

RESTRICTING AUDITING FIRMS--AL-QABAS has learned that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has decided to restrict auditing firms to only those Kuwaitis who hold licences. These are firms that handle millions yearly and are the same that essentially audit the accounts of Kuwaiti companies. As a result the ministry granted a 3-year grace period to firms that hold non-Kuwaiti licences. From now on it will resume its policy of restricting licences for non-Kuwaitis and will again resume its registration of them and limit them to the registers of the Ministry of Commerce until the accounting operation begins in 3 years (the grace period). An official source stated that the auditing firms owned by Kuwaitis have increased considerably and now exceed 100, and that they have also become very proficient in their operations while this trade used to be limited to firms that were owned by non-Kuwiatis. He added that the reputation of these Kuwaiti owned and managed firms has spread beyond Kuwait to neighboring countries to the point where it has become necessary to suspend the licencing of those non-Kuwaiti firms already licenced in the past. He said that the 3-year grace period was considered to be adequate for these firms to arrange for the closing down of their operations and earnings. This period is also beneficial to Kuwaiti owned firms to improve their practices and to solidify their position so that they can assume the responsibilities of the other firms. The source said: "It is possible that employees of the non-Kuwaiti owned firms could go to work for one of the Kuwaiti owned auditing firms... However this point is subject to secondary factors and the law of supply and demand. There are no legal measures that can be taken, it can be determined only by the individual's work experience. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 18 Jul 81 p 15] 9587

AID TO PAKISTAN—Yesterday a spokesman on behalf of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that Pakistan had directed Kuwait's participation last year toward its economic developmental programs, especially in the underdeveloped parts of Baluchistan. Local correspondents in Ismamabad reported that the unexpected increase in Kuwaiti aid came about as a result of the discussions that the Omir of Kuwait held during his visit to Pakistan last September. His Excellency expressed a concern for Pakistan's development especially in Baluchistan and promised to increase assistance funds. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has granted three loans to Pakistan this year and it is expected that a fourth one will be granted in September. The spokesman said that all three loans given this year by the Fund to Pakistan have amounted to \$58.7 million. One of these will be used for a natural gas project; another for a rural electrification project which will benefit 180 villages; and the third loan will be used for a project to distribute drinking and irrigation waters in the Quetta-Gadani region as well as to build a fertilizer plant in the

Punjab. He said that Kuwaiti funds are also being spent on a number of developmental projects in Pakistan such as the project to install electric power between Karachi and Guddu. The spokesman added that Kuwait has also given some support for Pakistan's balance of payments to the amount of \$130 million for this year and last. He said that a Kuwaiti-Pakistani Investment Company which was founded with initial capitalization of \$25 million has recently received support that raised its paid capital up to \$100 million. The spokesman expressed his belief that Kuwait will continue to manifest its concern for Pakistan's development especially in the poor sections of Baluchistan. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Jul 81 p 13] 9587

CSO: 4304/85

DEMOCRACY, LABOR UNIONS, ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTY DISCUSSED

Tunis AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jul 81 pp 8-9

[Interview with Mohamed Harmel, Secretary General of the Tunisian Communist Party; in Tunis; date not specified: "Secretary General of Tunisian Communist Party Tells AL-SHA'B, 'We Will Make Every Effort To Bring about the Success of the Democratic Experiment so It Can Be an Effective Tool for Democracy' "]

[Text] "Multiple labor unions weaken the labor union movement and violate labor union democracy."
"A single party is harmful, but a single labor union is good."
"The independence of the union guarantees that the interests of workers will be defended."
"We support the independence of the labor union movement from all parties including ours."
"We want a strong, united union."
"We wish to join the remaining movements and come up with common lists [of candidates]."
"Tyranny does not settle disputes or problems; dialogue is the solution."

Mohamed Harmel, whose name is often heard when communism in Tunisia is discussed, is a prominent figure in the Tunisian Communist party. He has been the secretary general of the party since February 1981, succeeding Mr Mohamed al-Nafi'. We met him only 3 days after the announcement that the ban on the party's activity would be lifted.

He greeted us in his home in the Bardu subdivision where we had a lengthy discussion that lasted 3 hours and touched upon various subjects. He was effusive as though the years of silence had created in him an unbridled desire to talk.

He spoke to us at first about the reasons for the ban that was imposed on the party's activity more than 18 years ago. He said, "They found fault with our speeches and our articles and considered our critical remarks 'an infringement on the dignity of the head of state and the members of

government.' In official speeches they used to say that we were materially involved in the conspiracy, but it later became evident that we were as far removed as possible from involvement in such a reactionary attempt to overthrow the government."

Then he spoke about the period that followed independence and preceded the resolution to ban the party, and he spoke about the role that Tunisian communists played during that period. He said, "At that time we were alone in the opposition." Then we found ourselves talking about the new conditions that the country is experiencing today, and we talked about the return of the Tunisian Communist party to the political arena. We tried to determine the impact of the resolution on him, and he said, "We had no choice in the matter of timing. That was due to considerations that concern the government only. I can say, however, that the president's decision took us somewhat by surprise inasmuch as we did not expect it these days."

He spoke to us about the willingness of the communist party to embark upon the new democratic experiment with a sense of resolve and responsibility, and he expressed the hope that this experiment would succeed with the participation of all the Tunisian political and intellectual movements. [He also hoped] that there would be intense concern with repudiating the methods of violence and terror, regardless of their source.

He mentioned that there were several factors behind the appearance of some extremist tendencies today. The most important of those were the policy which was pursued during the seventies and the turbulence, the void, the unemployment and the corruption that resulted therefrom.

He also informed us that the communist party has begun preparing [its] features for the new stage. It is getting ready to publish a weekly newspaper in Arabic called AL-TARIQ AL-JADID [The New Road]; Harmel was expecting it to be published next September. Later, the party also intends to publish a monthly, philosophical magazine that would concern itself with Marxist and progressive thought in general.

Mr Mohamed Harmel took part in the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist party where he delivered a speech. He also participated and was involved in several international seminars for communist parties and progressive movements. Our discussion touched upon other subjects and topics regarding the positions of the Tunisian Communist party on several questions. The full text of the interview follows.

[Question] The measures that were taken in January 1963 to ban the activity of the Tunisian Communist party were lifted recently. What is your evaluation of this event?

[Answer] We consider this a historical event regardless of the circumstances that surrounded it. It is a historical event for communists and for all the democratic forces in Tunisia. This is because the Communist party is the political party of the working class; it is the party of the toiling masses. The Tunisian Communist party is not a new party in Tunisia

for it has historical roots and ties with the labor movement. It has gone through various stages that included positive as well as negative [developments]. At the same time, the Tunisian Communist party is a party that has revived itself, using the experiences it has had and the lessons it has drawn to go forward and trying to stay as close as possible to Tunisian reality and to the aspirations of the popular masses and young people.

Everyone gains from this event which can be a reliable tool that can be used to continue working for the establishment of democratic liberties, for recognition of the various political parties without exception and for the confirmation of a general legislative amnesty.

The ban on the Communist party had sought to set the stage for a single party [system], and the stage was actually set for a single party. But today, our party has been able to regain its statutory legitimacy.

[Question] Recognition of your party constitutes the onset of legal multiple political parties. What is your view of this multiple party system?

[Answer] We see it as including political movements other than ours which must be recognized regardless of the results of the next legislative elections and whether or not they take part in those elections.

[Question] Will you take part in those elections?

[Answer] We have not yet decided what our position will be on those elections, but we will look into the subject, and we will make a decision in the coming weeks.

At any rate we proposed to the other movements the possibility of coming up with common lists [of candidates]. Discussions with others, and especially with the Socialist Democratic Movement, are still going on regarding this idea.

[Question] What role will the Tunisian Communist party play in the country?

[Answer] As the first party to have legal recognition, the entry of the Tunisian Communist party in the political arena marks the end of the period during which a single party, a single idea and a single view [prevailed]. This is in general. But its special contribution as a communist party will be uncommon because the party has positions, suggestions and studies on several economic, social, political and cultural questions that are of interest to the country. Not all of these positions and opinions are ready and definitive. These rather represent a continuous effort we pledge to undertake so we can benefit from others and try to be useful [at the same time]. We will be harshly critical of everything we see as negative and contrary to the interests of workers, the popular masses and the country. However, our criticisms as usual will always be responsible, well—considered, constructive and accompanied by support for all positive positions. We are determined to make our utmost efforts for the success of the democratic experiment which is still at the beginning of its course,

[beset by] conflicts and obstacles which are still delaying it. We will make every effort so that this experiment will become successful, surmount the conflicts, overcome all the obstacles and become an effective tool for economic and social development.

[Question] Tunisia experienced two kinds of development during the past two decades. How would you evaluate these two experiments?

[Answer] We consider the period of the sixties progressive in its goals. However, many errors were made, and these led to failure.

The second experiment during the seventies was capitalist in its goals and methods. It sharpened social and regional differences and set off a small number of fortunate people among the new bourgeoisie, most of whom were from the obsequious bourgeoisie. It too led to failure.

Therefore, a new, progressive and democratic alternative must be sought. This alternative must not repeat the previous experiment of the sixties. It must rather derive lessons from both experiments.

[Question] What are the general outlines of this alternative?

[Answer] First, true agrarian reform whose purpose is to limit large ownership of land is to be carried out.

Second, the present development model is to be replaced by another that is firmly based on the domestic market. The forces of production that are related to that market are to be encouraged, and all the vital forces and the nationalist social groups are to be invited to participate in the battle of development for which sacrifices can be made, provided its objectives are clear and serving the interests of all.

[Question] You have referred to workers more than once. What is the relationship between workers and the Communist party?

[Answer] The Tunisian Communist party considers itself part of the labor movement, and [as such], it expresses the political goals of labor. Sooner or later it wants to be serving the interests of labor at all times. Theoretically and historically it is closely fied to the future of the labor movement. The party and the labor movement are related in theory because the party's theory stems from the special role of the working class as a revolutionary force in the present and in the future. We cannot imagine the existence of a communist party without a working class. As the role of the working class grows, so should the role of the Communist party grow also.

The Tunisian Communist party is historically related to the labor movement in Tunisia, but it does not consider itself the only party that expresses the goals of the working class. It does not woo the working class or mislead it; nor does it advocate an immediate proletarian revolution. Instead, it calls for an alliance between the working class and the various other

nationalist groups. In this alliance the working class, with its various political and labor union bodies, would play a special role.

[Question] On the basis of everything that has already happened, how do you envision the relationship between the Tunisian Communist party and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT].

[Answer] We believe strongly in the independence of labor union movements from all parties, including our own. At the same time, however, we can envision cooperation between the labor union movement and political movements.

[Question] What is your understanding of this independence?

[Answer] Because it includes workers with different opinions and tendencies who come together to defend their interests in accordance with the resolutions of a labor union organization, a labor union has its own identity. This identity requires that the resolutions and actions of a labor movement be independent of parties so that that labor union can maintain its unity and its identity. However, our absolute respect for labor union independence does not mean that we are not interested in labor union questions. We are rather extremely interested in them.

[Question] Is this an appeal against politicizing the labor unions?

[Answer] Independence does not mean a lack of interest in politics. Politics takes an interest in workers, and workers too as well as the labor union movement have an interest in politics. But workers' interest in politics assumes a special form: they do not form a political party, but rather a labor union. Political parties and labor unions do not necessarily share the same political inclination.

Independence guarantees that the interests of workers will be defended regardless of the parties that are in power.

[Question] Before 1956 you were relying on a labor union that was friendly with you. Is the Communist party thinking today of repeating this experiment?

[Answer] We fully support the UGTT, and we want it to be united and strong at all times. We do not approve of multiple labor unions because the working class needs one organization. Multiple labor unions weaken the labor union movement and violate labor union democracy.

Communists used to work in their own labor unions, and the time to evaluate that period will come. However, since independence we decided to support the UGTT as the only labor union organization for the working class.

Having one party is detrimental, but having one labor union is beneficial. [The principle of] multiplicity must be political and must not be transferred to the labor unions especially since the UGTT is an association of workers with different political views.

[Question] What do you think about the duplication of labor union and political responsibility?

[Answer] On the basis of our respect for the independence of labor unions we will honor the resolutions that the UGTT itself will make in this regard. If the labor union movement itself rejects the principle of dual responsibility, we will respect this.

[Question] How do you view Islam as a political phenomenon in Tunisia?

[Answer] We actually consider the Islamic faction to be a faction, and we deal with it on that basis. We support the progressive and democratic aspects, and we resist reactionary ones.

In a country whose people are Muslim, we do not consider Islam to be restricted to anyone. Nor do we consider the battle today to be one between Muslims on the one hand and non-Muslims on the other. This is an economic, social, philosophical and political battle. It is not a religious battle. We defend progressive gains, but we believe that defending such gains is not to be accomplished by tyranny, but rather by dialogue.

By the way, we are denouncing the recent campaign of arrests that is being carried out in the circles of the Islamic faction, and we are calling for the release of Abdelfattah Moro, Rached Ghanouch and others. Tunisia's experience has confirmed that tyranny does not resolve disputes or solve problems and that the solution lies in [establishing] dialogue and in providing the opportunity for every movement to express its point of view.

[Question] Young Tunisians have many problems. Do you have a special contribution in this area?

[Answer] The problem of young people is a fundamental one because it concerns the future of the country and pertains to the rising generation and the vital force of society. Solving problems such as those of unemployment, dropping out of school and delinquency is closely tied to the adoption of a progressive and a democratic alternative that would enable young people to take part consciously in the battle of development. It would offer them noble objectives that are worthy of sacrifices.

[Question] Since 1963 the political scene in the country has seen the emergence of groups proclaiming their acceptance of Marxism. What is your position on these groups?

[Answer] Universities in particular saw the emergence of these active groups which proclaimed their acceptance of Marxism. Unfortunately they took from Marxism hardened, obsolete models—and especially the Maoist—Chinese models of Marxism—and wanted to apply them to conditions in Tunisia. They called for an immediate revolution without conducting a scientific analysis of the facts about the revolution in Tunisia or the objectives and the forces that got it started.

These groups engaged in hostile actions against the Tunisian Communist party because they considered the party a distortion [of what they believed in] and inconsistent with Maoism. They also declared their hostility to the socialist countries with the exception of China. They thus rejected all forms of alliance because they did not believe in alliances. They turned every ideological difference into hostility, and this led to different divisions in their midst.

At the same time, however, these groups struggled against tyranny and defied it. As much as we have criticized their mistakes and as much as we want them to draw lessons from the current experience, we do appreciate the sacrifices they made in the struggle against tyranny. Today, we call upon all the leftist elements, regardless of their inclinations, to join us in a dialogue and to work with us, especially since there are those among them who are prepared to join our party. There are also those among them who prefer to work privately. We respect this; we appreciate it; and we encourage it.

What is important is that we derive all the lessons and use all [our] energies so that the Marxist movement can become a vital, creative and strong movement.

[Question] You spoke about the university. What do you think about the student crisis?

[Answer] This crisis is related to the tyrannical policy that was perpetrated against the students in the last decade. It is also related to the errors that the student movement committed under the influence of leftist groups.

The only solution [to this crisis] lies in the re-creation of a general union for the students of Tunisia by means of convening an emergency conference, in view of the fact that the student union is a democratic labor union for all students regardless of their schools of thought and their inclinations. This union would be re-created on the basis of a common program whose main component would be constructive and honorable cooperation among students and abandonment of violent and terrorist practices regardless of their source. The student movement then would not be monopolized by one tendency at the expense of another.

[Question] The Destourian Socialist party presented a national charter at its recent conference. What do you think about it?

[Answer] We said that we agreed in principle with what was stated in the charter, but we added that that charter had to be discussed by the various movements and that its final status would be determined as a result of that discussion.

[Question] A point that has to do with relations with the outside world was mentioned in the charter. Do you consider yourselves concerned with this matter?

[Answer] We have said since day one that we are not concerned with what was stated regarding material or ideological ties with the outside world. We are an independent national party whose roots lie in the history of Tunisian society and the Tunisian labor movement.

I want to emphasize that we are a party that believes in solidarity between the workers and nations of the world. It is worth noting that the idea of solidarity between workers and nations is no longer a communist idea only, but is now being adopted by other movements.

[Question] How then do you view your relations with the Soviet Communist party?

[Answer] The relationship that exists between us and the Soviet Communist party is one of solidarity with the party of Lenin which carried out the first successful labor revolution in the history of humanity and achieved major accomplishments that turned backward Russia into the industrially and culturally prosperous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But our relationship is based on full independence and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Every party makes decisions about its own directions according to the interests of its people and its special conditions. The people of Mecca know the parts of their town best.

8592

CSO: 4504/52

END

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED 9-9-81